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Chapter 1
Parallel Exchange Rates and Economic Performance in Developing
Countries: Is the Medicine Worse than the Disease?
1.1 Introduction
The response of Central Banks to swings in capital flows is an area within
international finance that has received a lot of attention because of the impact such
swings may have on macroeconomic performance. The imposition of capital controls
is one way to deal with capital flow volatility. The discussion of their effectiveness
has sparked an ongoing debate (Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek, 2002) in academia
and in policy circles.
This chapter looks at a special case of capital controls: multiple exchange
rate systems. Their imposition has been a policy instrument used to stop capital
outflows and to avoid BOP crises. Recently Argentina (2002) and Venezuela (2003)
have implemented multiple exchange rates in an effort to stop capital flight and
to prevent financial crises, in situations where a unified devaluation is not a viable
policy option, because high pass-through and liability dollarization imply that a
unitary devaluation would lead to high inflation, deteriorating balance sheets and
bankruptcies; and where defending the currency is also not an attractive option due
to lack of reserves or concerns that rising interest rates will depress economic activity
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and also hurt firms’ profitability as debt service increases. These side effects make
multiple exchange rate systems attractive, because they preserve the stabilization
role of monetary policy and they also might stop capital flight without having an
inflation spike.
Multiple exchange rates segment the foreign currency market so that different
exchange rates apply to different types of transactions. When multiple exchange
rates are in place, the government sets an official or preferential exchange rate for
some -or all- current account transactions, and creates a parallel exchange rate at a
higher value1 for capital account transactions. So, if there is a run against the local
currency or if there is a shock to the capital account, the parallel rate depreciates
automatically, without affecting the domestic price of imports, and without forcing
the Central Bank to lose reserves or increase interest rates.
Given the undesired side effects of the standard tools that Central Banks have
available to defend their currencies, multiple exchange rates have been advocated
as a good alternative, at least in the short run. For example, during the East
Asian crisis, Krugman (1998) advocated for “something radical”, suggesting the
imposition of capital controls on outflows to help economic activity rebound in East
Asian economies after IMF intervention seemed unsatisfactory2. Dornbusch (1986)
1Throughout this dissertation, the exchange rate is defined as units of local currency per unit
of foreign currency.
2...“Exporters were required to sell their foreign-currency earnings to the government at a fixed
exchange rate; that currency would in turn be sold at the same rate for approved payments to
foreigners, basically for imports and debt service. Whilst some countries tried to make other
foreign exchange transactions illegal, other countries allowed a parallel market. Either way, once
the system was in place, a country didn’t have to worry that cutting interest rates would cause
the currency to plunge.”, Paul Krugman, Saving Asia: It’s time to get radical, Fortune Magazine,
(1998)
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also recommended that developing countries should implement parallel exchange
rates to protect domestic prices from speculative attacks to their currencies.
But Ghei, Kiguel and O’Connell (1997) question the effectiveness of paral-
lel exchange rates. They conclude that the ability to insulate the economy from
shocks fades over time. They also report that parallel exchange rates typically hide
structural fiscal problems that ultimately result in higher parallel premiums, and in
traumatic unifications.
Nevertheless, the impact of multiple exchange rates on macroeconomic perfor-
mance has not received full attention in the literature. Most existing studies look at
macroeconomic performance and capital controls without paying attention to their
simultaneous determination3. Moreover, not all capital controls are created equal.
Some policies target capital inflows while others restrict capital outflows.
This chapter looks at the implications of a particular type of control on out-
flows. It estimates both the effect of parallel exchange rates on economic perfor-
mance and how economic performance influences the propensity to segment the for-
eign exchange market, using an unbalanced panel of 61 countries for the 1974-2001
period. It finds not only that multiple exchange rates hurt economic performance,
but also that poor economic performance makes the adoption of parallel exchange
rates more likely, suggesting the existence of a negative feedback mechanism between
3The empirical growth literature acknowledges this simultaneity problem, although it looks at
the parallel premium mostly as a proxy for distortions caused by government intervention rather
than as a policy tool to stop capital outflows. Moreover, the growth literature focuses on long run
issues, rather than annual fluctuations, which are the focus of this chapter. Cardoso and Goldfajn
(1998) look at the determinants of capital inflows in Brazil, controlling for the simultaneity of
capital controls by including in their estimation a reaction function for the government which
responds to capital inflows.
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macroeconomic performance and foreign exchange market segmentation. It also
finds that high debt service, liability dollarization and exchange rate pass-through
make the adoption of parallel exchange rates more likely.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews some of the existing
theoretical literature and empirical evidence on capital controls, multiple exchange
rates and economic performance. Section 1.3 takes a look at the data. Section 1.4
describes the empirical methodology. Section 1.5 discusses the results and conducts
some robustness checks. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Capital Controls, Multiple Exchange Rate Systems and Eco-
nomic Performance: Literature Review
There is an active ongoing debate on the pros and cons of capital controls.
As Edison et al (2002) point out, there are mixed empirical results on the effects of
capital controls. From a theoretical standpoint, a leading argument against controls
stresses that they prevent risk sharing and the efficiency gains that countries may
obtain by allowing capital to flow freely. The opposing view stresses that countries
with no capital controls face undesirable volatility when capital flows experience
abrupt swings.
Cooper et al (1999) assert that the existing discussions of capital controls
“do not lead to strong, definitive conclusions”. They argue that liberalizing capital
movements is a good idea if some conditions are met, such as low barriers to trade
and healthy domestic financial markets. If these conditions do not hold, liberaliz-
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ing capital movements would result in serious misallocations and macroeconomic
vulnerability. Frenkel, Nickel, Schmidt and Stadtmann (2001) extend Dornbusch’s
overshooting model to investigate how capital controls affect exchange rates and
output. They argue that capital controls increase domestic interest rates and hence
they have a negative effect on economic performance because of the dampening effect
on investment. Stockman and Herna´ndez (1988) build a general equilibrium model
to study the welfare effects of taxes on purchases of foreign currency and on foreign
income bearing assets. They find that these taxes lower welfare and also reduce
trade. Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1993) study the political determinants of
capital controls and the effect of capital controls on economic performance, using
a sample of 20 OECD countries for the 1950-1989 period. They find that capital
controls are introduced when the Central Bank lacks independence and they reject
the hypothesis that capital controls reduce growth.
The literature not only presents mixed results on the desirability of capital con-
trols in general, but also on the relative merits of controls on inflows versus controls
on outflows. Cooper et al (1999) favor restrictions on capital outflows rather than
restrictions on capital inflows. They also favor restrictions on short-term capital
movements over restrictions on long term flows, like FDI. Edwards (1999) criticizes
controls on capital outflows. He claims that they are ineffective, become permanent
and foster corruption. He also points out that the impact of controls on capital
inflows in Chile has been exaggerated. He argues that there was no significant effect
on the Chilean real exchange rate and a very small effect on interest rates, while
the capital controls program increased the cost of capital for small and medium size
5
firms. Cordella (1998) builds on Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to show that controls
on capital inflows can reduce emerging markets vulnerability to shocks and hence
can be successful in catalyzing capital flows. This happens because “the tax on
inflows can prevent bank runs, and through this channel, can increase the expected
returns on investing in emerging markets”. This result suggests an improvement in
economic performance. Tamirisa (2004) examines how the macroeconomic effects
of capital controls in Malaysia vary depending on which type of financial transac-
tions they cover. Using an error correction model, she reports that capital controls
have negligible effects on the exchange rate. She also finds that controls on out-
flows reduce domestic interest rates, while controls on inflows do the opposite, a
result that supports Edwards critique of the Chilean capital controls program and
is also consistent with one of the purported advantages of multiple exchange rate
systems. Reinhart and Smith (1997) study the macroeconomic effects and welfare
consequences of temporary controls on capital inflows. They develop a monetary
general equilibrium model, and find that controls on inflows are only effective if the
tax rate is very high. They also conjecture that there might be negative welfare
effects of capital controls if high domestic interest rates hurt real activity. Bhagwati
(1998) says that the benefits of capital mobility are not persuasive. He points out
that “ Substantial gains have been asserted, not demonstrated [from capital mobil-
ity]”. He suggests that it is a mistake to think that free capital mobility is as good
as free trade, because capital flows are subject to “panics and manias” that push
countries into trouble.
It may be argued that multiple exchange rates are not really capital controls,
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in the sense that they are not explicit taxes on capital outflows and that they do
not impose quantity restrictions that prevent capital from flowing freely. In a sense,
capital is still free to move. But multiple exchange rates introduce a parallel market
for financial transactions in foreign currency, with a floating exchange rate that
automatically adjusts to pressures in the capital account. Since agents that want to
buy foreign currency for imports face a lower exchange rate than agents trying to pull
out their investments, in that sense, the parallel premium is like a tax agents have to
pay to liquidate their investments from a country, with the feature that the tax rate
adjusts with market forces. From this perspective, multiple exchange rates trigger
a time varying endogenous tax on capital outflows (Marion 1997). When there is a
speculative attack on the domestic currency, the parallel rate depreciates as much as
needed to stop speculators from buying the foreign currency. As Dornbusch (1986)
points out, assets markets are still integrated, but parallel exchange rates break the
law of one price because devaluations occur only for financial transactions. More
generally, as Ghei et al (1997) remark, “the spread between the parallel and official
exchange rate acts as a shadow tax/subsidy scheme, penalizing individuals who
surrender foreign exchange at the official rate and rewarding those who purchase it
at the official rate.” In this line, Easterly (1994) builds a model in which he shows
that a higher premium acts as an implicit tax on exports, decreasing the steady
state growth rate.
The empirical growth literature uses the parallel premium as a “proxy for
government distortions of markets” (Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1998)) and finds a
negative effect on economic growth. Fisher (1993) and Easterly (1994) report a
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similar result. But, as indicated earlier, these papers look at the parallel black
market premium as a proxy for government induced distortions on free markets. It
is worth noting that in my approach, the parallel market premium is not “black”
because there are not necessarily black markets. Instead, I look at episodes when
the government has segmented the foreign exchange market, and legally has created
several exchange rates for the same currency to prevent capital outflows. Further-
more, for the question that this chapter is exploring, the parallel premium itself is
not meaningful, because there might be episodes of multiple exchange rates that
have a very low premium if there is no inflation and monetary policy is perfectly
consistent with the official rate4. My goal is to study episodes of foreign exchange
market segmentation, regardless of the premium level.
Ghei, Kiguel and O’Connell (1997) also argue that export underinvoicing and
import overinvoicing increase as controls remain in place for longer and as the par-
allel premium increases, creating a leak in the system and undermining the desired
price-reserves insulation.
Kamin (1997) studies multiple exchange rates in Argentina from 1982 to 1989.
He claims that the government chose controls without implementing a fiscal adjust-
ment, deepening the crisis that ended in the hyperinflation of the late 80’s. He also
finds that the Argentine government had to continuously devalue the official (prefer-
ential) rate because the parallel premium was too high and exports began leaking to
the parallel market increasingly. In an effort to stop this distortion in international
trade, the government repeatedly tried to reduce the premium by devaluing the of-
4I would like to thank Carmen Reinhart for making this point.
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ficial rate, but the devaluation of the official rate translated into higher inflation,
with predictable results.
Kaminsky (1997) studies the Mexican experience with parallel rates from 1982
to 1987, and evaluates the ability of parallel rates to insulate domestic prices. She
finds that the dual exchange rate system failed to insulate domestic prices. Specif-
ically, using a VAR approach she finds that shocks to the parallel rate translated
into higher inflation, hence rejecting the hypothesis of domestic price insulation.
Hausmann (1997) looks at the Venezuelan experience with capital controls
in the 1983 − 1989 period. This case is interesting because Venezuela not only
adopted foreign exchange controls for the capital account, but also introduced import
rationing. In his paper, Hausmann develops a model of dual exchange rate markets
and import controls. He finds that the inconsistency between the exchange rate
regime and fiscal policy was the main reason for the failure of the dual regime. This
finding is remarkable because it highlights the relevance of sound fiscal policy, given
that most of Venezuela’s exports come from the public sector (Oil), so that trade
leaks were not an issue in this case.
1.3 Some Facts and Figures
Before conducting a more rigorous analysis, and to understand better how
multiple exchange rate systems are empirically related to economic performance,
I look at the stylized facts within a sample of 2,581 annual observations between
1974-2001 for 113 developing countries. I included all countries with data on per
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capita GDP growth and on multiple exchange rates. Table 1.1 splits the observations
in groups with and without multiple rates, and shows some descriptive statistics5.
Figure 1.1 plots the GDP per capita growth rate density for each group. The
figure suggests that countries achieve higher economic growth on average without
parallel rates than otherwise. In fact, table 1.1 tells us that countries with parallel
rates have grown on average by -0.20%, whereas countries without multiple rates
have grown by 1.94% on average. For illustrative purposes I perform in Table 2.2
a mean comparison test which rejects at 1% level the null hypothesis that mean
GDP per capita growth is equal between these two groups, against the alternative
that mean GDP growth is higher for countries without multiple exchange rates.
It is worth noting that countries with multiple rates have also experienced higher
volatility than countries with a unitary exchange rate. The standard deviation of
per capita GDP growth is higher when countries decide to segment the foreign
exchange market (8.388) than when they decide not to do so (7.295). Table 2.3
reports the result of a standard deviation comparison test, which rejects at 1%
significance level the null hypothesis that both types of countries have the same
volatility, against the alternative that countries without multiple exchange rates
have lower volatility in per capita GDP growth rates. Figure 1.2 plots the cumulative
distribution for the two groups. The figure suggests that the probability of observing
GDP per capita growth rates less than or equal to any given value is always higher
for countries with multiple rates6. To formalize these findings, I perform a non-
5If a country experienced at least 6 months of parallel rates is counted as “with multiple rates”.
I explain next this criteria in more detail.
6This is equivalent to say that the per capita GDP growth distribution without multiple rates
first order stochastic dominates the one with multiple rates.
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parametric hypotheses test to check whether or not these growth rates distributions
are statistically different. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test rejects the null hypothesis
that the growth rates distributions come from the same process at 1% significance
level. Moreover, the estimated probability that GDP per capita growth without
multiple rates is higher than GDP per capita growth with multiple rates is 0.60,
supporting the preliminary finding that economic growth with multiple rates is
lower than with unified rates.
Tables 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6 list the 113 countries included in the sample, and also
how many periods they spend with and without multiple rates. Sixty-six countries
have experienced periods with and without multiple exchange rates, eight countries
have had multiple rates in the whole sample, and thirty-nine countries have never
experienced multiple rates. The number of periods is not the same across countries
because of data availability. It is also interesting to analyze how countries move from
periods with multiple rates to periods without multiple rates and vice-versa. Ta-
ble 1.7 shows the transition frequencies and the corresponding maximum likelihood
estimates for the Markov transition probabilities 7. In the full sample described
above, 882 observations continued with multiple exchange rate systems in the fol-
lowing period, 96 observations abandoned multiple rates in the following period,
1,538 observations stayed away from multiple rates in the following period and 43
observations imposed multiple rates in the following period. These results confirm
the fact that multiple exchange rates become persistent once they are implemented.
7The maximum likelihood estimates of the transition probabilities in a discrete state Markov
process are the sample relative frequencies. See Bhat and Miller (2002, page 131) for a derivation
of this result.
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Figure 1.1: Density of Annual GDP Per Capita Growth Rates for Developing Coun-
tries between 1974-2001
This evidence, of course, does not prove that multiple exchange rates cause
poor economic performance. Estimating the impact of multiple exchange rates is
complicated by omitted variables and by reverse causality. For example, it might be
the case that poor performance is due to currency crises and not to capital controls
themselves, and because currency crises and multiple exchange rate episodes are
positively correlated, one might mistakenly blame foreign exchange market segmen-
tation for poor performance. Alternatively, poor economic performance per se might
cause countries to adopt multiple exchange rate regimes. To tackle these problems,
in the next section I conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis that controls for
potential omitted variables and addresses simultaneity issues, among other things.
In the appendix I describe the sources and definitions of the variables employed in
next section.
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Figure 1.2: Cumulative Distribution of Annual GDP Per Capita Growth Rates for
Developing Countries between 1974-2001
1.4 Empirical Methodology and Theoretical Underpinnings
To estimate the effects of multiple exchange rates on economic performance
and vice-versa, I first estimate a system of equations by iterated 3SLS8. The benefit
of using a system estimator is that if the equations are correctly specified, 3SLS
is more efficient than 2SLS, at the expense that 3SLS has the drawback that if
one or more of the equations is not correctly specified, all the estimates become
inconsistent. For this reason I then re-estimate the system by 2SLS. This is an
equation-by-equation estimator that lets me estimate each equation consistently
even if the other one is misspecified. The endogenous variables for this system
are measures of economic performance and foreign exchange controls. To mea-
8By iterated 3SLS I mean that besides the standard 3SLS procedure, I iterate on the variance-
covariance matrix until the estimates converge, as in a feasible generalized least squares fashion.
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sure economic performance I use annual per capita GDP growth; the econometric
specification for the performance equation is borrowed from the empirical growth
literature. Because there are many variables that potentially affect economic perfor-
mance, I adopt a generally accepted specification, to which I add a binary variable
(multipleXR) that is equal to 1 if a country has experienced at least 6 months of
dual/multiple exchange rates system in a given year and zero otherwise9. I also
add a discrete regressor (crisisperyear), to control for the effects of currency crises
on economic performance. To capture the effects of worldwide exogenous external
shocks I include annual dummies.
The performance equation to estimate is:
gdp pc gi,t = multipleXRi,tδ +X
(1)
i,t β1 +X
(2)
i,t−1β2 + ηt + ui,t (1.1)
where gdp pc gi,t is the growth rate of real per capita GDP in country i and period
t, X
(1)
i,t is a vector of explanatory variables for country i in period t, X
(2)
i,t−1 is a vector
of additional explanatory variables for country i in period t-1, ηt is a set of year
dummy variables that change across t but not across i and that capture aggregate
shocks, and ui,t is an independent and identically distributed error term.
To build the multiple rates measure I look at “The Country Chronologies and
Chartbook Background Material to a Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrange-
ments: A Reinterpretation” by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). In their appendix the
second column indicates for each country the number of months in which there have
9The results in this chapter do not change if I take 3, 6 or 9 months of multiple rates as the
threshold value to build the controls measure.
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been parallel/multiple exchange rates. The crisis (crisisperyear) regressor adds the
number of months within a year in which the local currency either experiences a
monthly depreciation rate greater than or equal to 25% or when the difference from
the previous month’s depreciation rate is greater than or equal to 10%. The X
(1)
i,t
vector includes explanatory variables for the illiteracy rate (ilit), civil liberties (civil),
political rights (polright) and terms of trade growth rate (delta tt). The X
(2)
i,t−1 vec-
tor includes explanatory variables for the investment rate (gfkf gdp), growth rate
of the government consumption to GDP ratio (g gov gdp), government’s primary
balance to GDP ratio (budbal gdp) , M2 to GDP ratio (m2 gdp), trade openness
(open), inflation rate (inflation), total debt service to exports ratio (tds x) and the
net reserves to GDP ratio (netres gdp).
To identify the effect of multiple exchange rates on economic growth, I use as
instruments the ratio of debt denominated in foreign currency to foreign long term
debt (currcomplt) , the fraction of short term debt to external debt (stdebt xdebt),
and the manufactures’ fraction of total merchandise imports (manufimports). To
avoid simultaneity problems, all the excluded variables have been lagged one period.
That is, the identifying assumption is that these 3 variables have no direct impact on
next period growth, besides their indirect effect through the likelihood to implement
a multiple exchange rate system in the next period.
The currcomplt variable captures the currency mismatch in a country’s debt
structure and proxies its degree of liability dollarization. The mismatch per se
should not affect next period’s growth rate directly, apart from its effect on the
exchange rate regime. For example, if there is a negative shock that puts pressure
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on the exchange rate and the currency mismatch is perceived to be critical, policy-
makers would rather implement a partial devaluation through multiple rates rather
than a unified devaluation. The partial devaluation then would leave interest pay-
ments unaffected, though principal payments would still increase (but they would
have been affected anyway with a unified devaluation). So, given a negative shock,
higher currcomplt makes a multiple exchange rate system more likely, which in turn
may -or may not- affect growth. The stdebt xdebt variable controls for the maturity
imbalance that might be present in external debt, pushing a country into a liquidity
crisis if a negative shock arrives. This measure of liquidity risk should not affect
next period’s output directly, apart from its effect on the exchange rate regime. As
stated above, under a partial devaluation debt service remains unchanged, and this
makes parallel rates more desirable when interest payments are concentrated in the
near future. So the higher the liquidity risk, the more likely is a multiple exchange
rate system, which in turn may -or may not- affect growth. Finally, manufimports
is intended to capture the degree of potential pass-through that may exist in an
economy. Manufactured imports are a good proxy for pass-through because a de-
valuation would affect their domestic price, triggering an inflationary process10. So
countries where the share of manufactures in total imports is high, have a higher
pass-through, and therefore when facing a potential devaluation would rather seg-
ment the foreign exchange market to keep inflation controlled.
So far I have described how to identify and estimate the effects of multiple
10The underlying assumption is that manufactured imports are part of households’ consumption
basket. See Bailliu and Bouakez (2004) for an updated survey.
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exchange rate systems on economic performance. These effects can be estimated
by 2SLS, which should yield consistent estimates of the causal link from multiple
exchange rate systems to output growth. But another goal of this chapter is to
find the determinants behind the decision to segment the foreign exchange market.
So I still have to describe how to identify and estimate the effects of economic
performance on the likelihood of segmenting the foreign exchange market.
To pin down the specification for the multiple exchange rate determination
equation, I rely on economic theory and on case studies about this particular type
of capital control. The instrumental variables described above are included variables
in the multiple rate equation. I also include the terms of trade growth rate and the
one period lags of the inflation rate, the total debt service to exports ratio, the net
reserves to GDP ratio, the growth rate of the government consumption to GDP
ratio and the government’s primary balance to GDP ratio. As explained earlier,
fear of inflation is one motivation policymakers have for choosing multiple exchange
rates rather than devaluing the currency or increasing interest rates. For this reason
I include lagged annual CPI inflation (inflation) as an explanatory variable, and I
expect its sign to be positive. Most countries segment the foreign exchange market
when facing BOP problems and as previously stated, countries choose to impose
multiple exchange rates to insulate their reserves from shocks to the capital account.
First generation models of BOP crises suggest that the stock of reserves and the fiscal
variables are natural candidates for explanatory variables. The lower the reserves,
the more likely that the Central Bank will segment the foreign exchange market
because it is in a weaker position to defend a peg. Similarly, the worse the fiscal
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performance, the more likely that multiple exchange rates would be observed.
Case studies suggest that parallel/multiple exchange rates are introduced when
countries are having trouble paying their international debt (see Kamin (1997) on
Argentina and Ghei et al (1997) on Mexico). Furthermore, debt intolerance (Rein-
hart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003)) plays a crucial role because as credit access con-
ditions get harder, servicing external debt represents a bigger burden. Aizenmann
and Guidotti (1994) study how large domestic public debt might be associated with
the imposition of capital controls, when taxation is costly in welfare terms. They
show that policymakers may want to introduce capital controls to reduce the cost
of rolling over public debt. To control for this effect, I use the total debt service to
exports ratio (tds x). I expect the sign of this coefficient to be positive.
To identify the effect of GDP growth on multiple exchange regime adoption,
I use as excluded instruments the following regressors: crisis per year, the illiteracy
rate, the civil liberties index, the political rights index, and one period lags of the
investment to GDP ratio, M2 to GDP ratio, and trade openness (open). I assume
that all of these variables have an indirect impact on the likelihood to segment
the foreign exchange market through their direct effect on economic growth. Then,
using a linear probability model11, I estimate the following equation:
11Although the linear probability model is not strictly appropriate if the dependent variable
is dichotomous, it is often considered because it is simpler when the model contains endogenous
variables. See Calvo, Izquierdo and Mej´ıa (2004) for a similar application.
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multipleXRi,t = γ0 + γ1gdp pc gi,t + γ2currcomplti,t−1 + γ3manufimportsi,t−1
+γ4stdebt xdebti,t−1 + γ5tds xi,t−1 + γ6delta tti,t
+γ7netres gdpi,t−1 + γ8inflationi,t−1 + γ9g gov gdpi,t−1
+γ10budbal gdpi,t−1 + ²i,t (1.2)
Once all the regressors are taken into account, the sample reduces to 818 obser-
vations for 61 countries. Tables 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 show the country list, descriptive
statistics and pairwise correlations, respectively.
1.5 Estimation Results and Robustness Analysis
As a reference, Table 1.11 reports the estimation results using OLS. These
results are not consistent because multiple exchange rates are endogenous, as Table
1.12 confirms. Table 1.13 shows the results for the estimation by 3SLS and 2SLS.
The 3SLS estimation shows that the multiple rates coefficient in the performance
equation is negative and significant at 1%. Crises per year, fiscal performance, and
the investment and literacy rate have significant effects on growth with the expected
sign. In the parallel rates adoption equation, the coefficient on economic growth
is negative and significant at 5%. Liability dollarization, inflation pass-through,
liquidity risk and debt service have significant effects at 1% with the expected signs.
These results suggest that poor economic growth, liability dollarization (through the
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balance sheet channel), fear of inflation, maturity imbalances and high debt service
(relative to exports) have some power to explain the likelihood of observing multiple
exchange rate systems, but at the same time, multiple exchange rate systems hurt
economic performance. This negative feedback mechanism is what makes multiple
exchange rate systems undesirable, because they do exactly the opposite of what
they were designed to do.
A potential critique for these results could be that 3SLS requires more con-
ditions for consistency than 2SLS, and therefore a robust and more conservative
estimator should be used. The third and fourth columns in Table 1.13 show the
results for the 2SLS estimation. As explained earlier the advantage is that misspec-
ification of one equation affects that equation only, and does not contaminate the
other one. The 2SLS results are similar to the baseline 3SLS estimation. Also notice
that the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are jointly equal to zero is
rejected for 3SLS and 2SLS.
Because there are more instruments than endogenous variables in each equa-
tion, it is possible to perform an overidentifiying restrictions test to check the va-
lidity of the instrument set. Table 1.14 displays the results of these tests for both
equations, estimated by 2SLS. The validity of the instruments is not rejected for
the performance equation, while it is disappointingly rejected for the controls equa-
tions. These results cast some doubt on the validity of the instruments utilized to
identify the effect of economic performance on the likelihood of segmenting the for-
eign exchange market, but support the choice of instruments to identify the effect
of multiple exchange rate systems on economic performance.
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To verify the instruments’ relevance, Tables 1.15 and 1.16 display the estima-
tion results of the first stage regression for the growth and multiple exchange rate
equations, respectively. Table 1.15 shows that the instrumental variables are not
only individually and jointly significant but also have the expected sign. Table 1.16
shows that the instruments are jointly significant. In this case, the crisis, invest-
ment rate, human capital and trade openness instrumental variables are individually
significant but the institutional and financial development instruments are not.
Is Unobserved Heterogeneity Important?
In order to check the robustness of the above results, I control for unobserved
heterogeneity at the country level. As Mundlak (1978) argues, the key issue here is
whether or not the unobserved country components are correlated or not with the
right hand side regressors. Country specific effects may play a crucial role because
it may be the case that countries that have lower long run growth are precisely the
ones segmenting the foreign exchange market, introducing an important bias in the
results. In the present case, I re-estimate the system of equations, using the baseline
regressors plus country fixed effects in the growth regression and instrumenting for
the endogenous variables as before. Table 1.17 shows estimation results allowing
for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. In the growth equation, the controls
measure is significant at 5%, whereas in the multiple rate equation, GDP per capita
growth is significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that the negative link
between economic growth and the likelihood of segmenting the foreign exchange
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market is robust to the presence of unobserved country effects.
Are the results sensitive to the choice of the linear probability model?
A possible caveat of this results is that estimating equation (1.2) with a lin-
ear probability model is not a good choice because predicted probabilities are not
bounded in the [0, 1] interval12. As a response to this potential problem I use the
two-stage estimation method described in Maddala (1983)13 for simultaneous equa-
tions models in which one of the endogenous variables is continuous and the other
endogenous variable is dichotomous. In the first stage, the endogenous variables are
regressed on the exogenous variables, but the growth regression is estimated through
OLS, and the controls regression through probit maximum likelihood. Then, using
the fitted values from the first stage, equation (1.1) is estimated through OLS,
while equation (1.2) is estimated through probit maximum likelihood. The third
and fourth columns in table 1.17 present the results of this estimation. In the
growth equation, the controls measure is significant at 5%, and in the multiple rate
equation, GDP per capita growth is significant at the 10% level. These results sug-
gest, again, that the negative link between economic growth and the likelihood of
segmenting the foreign exchange market is not sensitive to the estimation technique
used to model the likelihood of implementing parallel rates.
12See Johnston and Dinardo (1997, page 414) for an excellent discussion.
13See Maddala (1983, pages 244-245).
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1.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I estimate the effect of multiple exchange rates on growth for
developing countries, and also estimate the determinants of the decision to segment
the foreign exchange market. I find not only that multiple exchange rates decrease
economic growth but also that poor economic performance, liability dollarization,
liquidity risk and a high debt service lead countries to segment the foreign exchange
market. The former result is contrary to what Alesina et al (1993) find for OECD
countries.
These findings suggest the existence of a contemporaneous feedback or re-
inforcing mechanism between multiple rates and economic performance. In other
words, countries that try to keep economic activity by segmenting the foreign ex-
change market, may wind up depressing it instead.
These results are robust to potential model misspecification, country fixed
effects, and to the choice of the probability model used to estimate the decision
to segment the parallel market. However the validity of the instruments used to
identify the effect of economic performance on the likelihood of adopting parallel
rates is in doubt.
If multiple exchange rates hurt economic activity, and if they are imposed when
things go bad, then why do we repeatedly observe governments segmenting foreign
exchange markets when facing economic turmoil14? There is a potential answer in
the Political Economy literature within the framework of signaling games. Bartolini
14Argentina (2002) and Venezuela (2003) are the most recent examples.
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and Drazen (1997) show that in bad states of nature, some policymakers may want
to signal their “tough” type and separate from others by liberalizing capital flows,
while “weak” types cannot follow this policy and impose capital controls. But
this answer raises the question on why the weak types impose controls, if economic
growth will suffer anyway. My conjecture is that this is a “buying time” story. Weak
types fall into the controls trap hoping to delay the crisis as much as possible, but as
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) show, most parallel rates episodes end up in traumatic
and painful unifications.
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1.7 Appendix
Appendix I: Sources and Definitions of Variables
All data is annual, and covers developing countries from 1974 to 2001.
budbal gdp: Primary surplus as a fraction of GDP. Source: World Development
Indicators 2003.
civil: civil liberties index, ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 is the best score and 7 is the
worst. Source: Annual Freedom in the World Country Scores.
crisisperyear: The crisis per year regressor adds the number of months within a year
in which the local currency either experiences a monthly depreciation rate
greater than or equal to 25% or when the difference from previous month’s
depreciation rate is greater than or equal to 10%. Source: Prof. Carmen
Reinhart.
currcomplt: The percentage of external long-term debt contracted in U.S. dollars for
the low- and middle-income countries. Long-term external debt is defined as
debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year and that
is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services.
Source: Global Development Finance 2001.
delta tt: growth rate of term of trade. Source: Gosh, Gulde & Wolf dataset.
gdp pc g: Is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita based on constant
local currency. Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
g gov gdp: is the growth rate of government consumption as a fraction of GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
gfkf gdp : Is physical investment as a fraction of GDP. Source: World Development
Indicators 2003.
illit: is the illiteracy rate. Source:World Development Indicators 2003.
inflation: CPI inflation rate. Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
manufimports: Is the share of manufactures imports in total imports. Manufactures
comprise the commodities in SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufac-
tures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous man-
ufactured goods), excluding division 68 (nonferrous metals). Source: World
Development Indicators 2003.
multipleXR : is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if in a given year
a country has had multipe/dual exchange rates for at least 6 months, and
zero otherwise. To build this dummy variable I look at appendixes 1 and 2 in
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) Modern History of Exchange Rates. If for a given
year there exist dual or multiple exchange rates markets for at least half of
the time, controls is equal to one.
m2 gdp: is M2 as a fraction of GDP. Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
netres gdp: Foreign net reserves as a fraction of GDP. World Development Indica-
tors 2003.
open: is trade openness, where the latter is defined as export plus imports divided
by GDP. Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
polright: political rights index, ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 is the best score and 7
is the worst. Source: Annual Freedom in the World Country Scores.
stdebt xdebt: Short-term debt to total external debt. Source: Global Development
Finance 2001.
tds x: is total debt service, as a fraction of exports. Source :World Development
Indicators 2003.
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Appendix II: Tables
Table 1.1: GDP per capita growth with and without multiple exchange rate systems
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Coef. Var. Min Max
With multiple
rates
938 -0.197 8.388 -42.579 -52.096 100.831
Without multiple
rates
1643 1.940 7.295 3.760 -44.813 138.8972
Sample of 2,581 observations, 1974-2001
Table 1.2: Two Sample t-test of Equality of Means
Ho: means are equal
Ha: mean with unitary exchange rates>mean with parallel rates
Variable: GDP per capita growth
t1,736 6.520
P-value 0.000
Sample of 113 countries, 2,581 observations, 1974-2001
Unequal variances allowed.
Table 1.3: Variance Ratio Test
Ho: Std. Dev. are equal
Ha: Std. Dev. with unitary exchange rates>Std. Dev. with parallel rates
Variable: GDP per capita growth
F 9371642 1.3221
P-value 0.000
Sample of 113 countries, 2,581 observations, 1974-2001
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Table 1.4: Developing countries with and without periods of multiple exchange rates
(1974-2001)
Number of periods
Countries With
unified
exchange
rate
With
multiple
exchange
rate
Total
Albania 9 2 11
Algeria 8 20 28
Argentina 16 12 28
Armenia 6 4 10
Azerbaijan 6 3 9
Belarus 4 7 11
Bolivia 1 27 28
Botswana 22 6 28
Brazil 3 25 28
Burundi 13 15 28
Chile 7 21 28
China 8 20 28
Colombia 8 20 28
Congo, Dem. Rep. 9 19 28
Costa Rica 18 10 28
Croatia 7 2 9
Dominican Republic 2 26 28
Ecuador 19 9 28
El Salvador 12 16 28
Gambia, The 23 5 28
Georgia 5 6 11
Ghana 8 20 28
Guatemala 11 17 28
Guinea-Bissau 24 4 28
Guyana 14 14 28
Haiti 21 7 28
28
Table 1.4 (Continued): Developing countries with and without periods of multiple
exchange rates (1974-2001)
Number of periods
Countries With
unified
exchange
rate
With
multiple
exchange
rate
Total
Kazakhstan 5 6 11
Kenya 11 17 28
Lebanon 10 3 13
Lesotho 16 12 28
Liberia 14 11 25
Malawi 19 9 28
Mauritania 6 22 28
Mauritius 20 1 21
Mexico 18 10 28
Moldova 7 4 11
Mongolia 9 2 11
Nepal 19 9 28
Nicaragua 12 13 25
Nigeria 9 19 28
Pakistan 3 25 28
Paraguay 13 15 28
Peru 11 17 28
Philippines 17 11 28
Poland 7 4 11
Romania 10 10 20
South Africa 10 18 28
Sri Lanka 24 4 28
Suriname 2 26 28
Swaziland 15 13 28
Tajikistan 6 4 10
Tanzania 7 6 13
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Table 1.5: Developing countries without multiple exchange rate periods (1974-2001)
Number of periods
Countries With
unified
exchange
rate
With
multiple
exchange
rate
Total
Antigua and Barbuda 24 0 24
Benin 28 0 28
Bosnia & Herzegovina 7 0 7
Bulgaria 12 0 12
Burkina Faso 28 0 28
Cameroon 28 0 28
Central African Rep. 28 0 28
Chad 28 0 28
Cote d’Ivoire 28 0 28
Czech Republic 11 0 11
Dominica 24 0 24
Equatorial Guinea 16 0 16
Estonia 11 0 11
Gabon 28 0 28
Grenada 24 0 24
Guinea 15 0 15
India 28 0 28
Korea, Rep. 28 0 28
Kyrgyz Republic 11 0 11
Latvia 11 0 11
Lithuania 11 0 11
Macedonia, FYR 9 0 9
Madagascar 28 0 28
Malaysia 28 0 28
Mali 28 0 28
Malta 28 0 28
Marshall Islands 19 0 19
Micronesia, Fed. Sts 14 0 14
Morocco 28 0 28
Niger 28 0 28
Panama 28 0 28
Senegal 28 0 28
Slovak Republic 9 0 9
St. Kitts and Nevis 24 0 24
St. Lucia 21 0 21
St. Vincent & Grndns 28 0 28
Thailand 28 0 28
Togo 28 0 28
Tunisia 28 0 28
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Table 1.6: Developing countries without unified exchange rate periods (1974-2001)
Number of periods
Countries With
unified
exchange
rate
With
multiple
exchange
rate
Total
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0 28 28
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0 27 27
Lao PDR 0 17 17
Libya 0 14 14
Myanmar 0 28 28
Russian Federation 0 10 10
Syrian Arab Republic 0 28 28
Turkmenistan 0 9 9
Table 1.7: Sample Frequencies and transition probabilities MLE
Period t+1
Multiple Exchange Rate Unified Exchange Rate Total
Multiple
Exchange 882 96 978
RatePeriod t
Unified
Exchange 43 1,538 1,581
Rate
2,559
Period t+1
Multiple Exchange Rate Unified Exchange Rate
Multiple
Exchange 0.902 0.098
RatePeriod t
Unified
Exchange 0.027 0.973
Rate
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Table 1.8: Periods with Multiple Rates: 61 Countries Effective Sample
Number of periods Number of periods
Countries With
unified
ex-
change
rate
With
multiple
ex-
change
rate
Total Countries With
unified
ex-
change
rate
With
multiple
ex-
change
rate
Total
Bolivia 1 12 13 Mexico 10 10 20
Brazil 1 11 12 Nepal 17 6 23
Chile 5 19 24 Nicaragua 7 6 13
China 6 3 9 Nigeria 2 4 6
Colombia 6 20 26 Pakistan 1 25 26
Costa Rica 12 10 22 Paraguay 11 13 24
Dominican
Rep.
2 11 13 Peru 8 12 20
Ecuador 12 7 19 Philippines 15 7 22
Hungary 7 9 16 Sri Lanka 18 2 20
Jamaica 12 5 17 Turkey 16 8 24
Jordan 20 1 21 Uganda 1 1 2
Kenya 7 16 23 Uruguay 16 5 21
Malawi 8 2 10 Venezuela,
RB
9 17 26
Mauritius 18 1 19 Zimbabwe 6 9 15
Burundi 0 6 6 Guatemala 0 7 7
Egypt 0 23 23 Iran 0 3 3
Gambia,
The
0 2 2 Russian
Fed.
0 1 1
Ghana 0 11 11 Syria 0 7 7
Albania 3 0 3 Lithuania 5 0 5
Algeria 5 0 5 Madagascar 10 0 10
Argentina 10 0 10 Malaysia 24 0 24
Belarus 1 0 1 Moldova 3 0 3
Bulgaria 3 0 3 Morocco 23 0 23
El Salvador 1 0 1 Panama 18 0 18
Estonia 4 0 4 Poland 5 0 5
Honduras 3 0 3 Romania 8 0 8
India 24 0 24 Senegal 11 0 11
Indonesia 18 0 18 South
Africa
5 0 5
Kazakhstan 2 0 2 Thailand 24 0 24
Korea, Rep. 22 0 22 Tunisia 15 0 15
Latvia 5 0 5
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Table 1.9: Effective Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
gdp pc g 818 1.801 4.617 -28.733 16.545
illit 818 25.708 21.407 0.204 81.962
civil 818 3.869 1.379 1.000 7.000
polright 818 3.572 1.756 1.000 7.000
multipleXR 818 0.381 0.486 0.000 1.000
crisisperyear 818 0.089 0.333 0.000 3.000
delta tt 818 -0.004 0.126 -0.780 0.749
gfkf gdp(-1) 818 21.448 6.475 3.531 43.586
g gov gdp(-1) 818 -0.001 0.116 -0.546 1.513
budbal gdp(-1) 818 -3.727 4.325 -31.297 5.413
m2 gdp(-1) 818 35.254 19.576 6.801 132.478
inflation(-1) 818 27.499 61.761 -7.634 951.649
netres gdp(-1) 818 0.084 0.065 0.003 0.407
currcomplt(-1) 818 49.529 18.485 0.400 93.000
fuel merch(-1) 818 14.569 9.966 0.276 58.614
stdebt xdebt(-1) 818 16.148 11.411 0.000 72.979
tds x(-1) 818 22.627 13.228 0.284 81.755
open(-1) 818 58.719 30.059 6.320 192.114
manufimports(-1) 818 65.783 11.578 28.853 90.592
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Table 1.11: OLS Estimation Results
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.)
Equation 1: Economic Growth
multipleXR -1.014*** (2.76)
crisisperyear -2.302*** (4.79)
gfkf gdp(-1) 0.106*** (3.54)
illit -0.010 (1.12)
g gov gdp(-1) -2.412* (1.80)
budbal gdp(-1) 0.009 (0.22)
civil 0.013 (0.06)
polright 0.067 (0.41)
delta tt 1.388 (1.11)
m2 gdp(-1) 0.007 (0.69)
open(-1) -0.024*** (3.42)
inflation(-1) -0.003 (1.01)
tds x(-1) -0.041*** (3.07)
netres gdp(-1) 9.123*** (2.90)
intercept 1.160 (0.50)
P-value 0.000
Equation 2: Multiple Exchange Rate
gdp pc g -0.009*** (2.57)
currcomplt(-1) 0.003*** (3.71)
manufimports(-1) 0.001 (0.90)
stdebt xdebt(-1) 0.001 (0.86)
tds x(-1) 0.006*** (4.54)
delta tt -0.083 (0.64)
netres gdp(-1) -0.238 (0.83)
inflation(-1) 0.001* (1.91)
g gov gdp(-1) -0.100 (0.70)
budbal gdp(-1) -0.011*** (2.64)
intercept -0.058 (0.49)
P-value 0.000
Observations 818
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors computed.
Variables in italic are the excluded instruments.
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Table 1.12: Tests of Endogeneity for Multiple Exchange Rates
Ho: Regressor is Exogenous
Equation 1: Economic Growth
Wu-Hausman F test
F 1777 6.789
P-value 0.009
Durbin-Wu-Hausman χ2 test
χ21 7.085
P-value 0.008
36
Table 1.13: 3SLS and 2SLS Estimation Results
Iterated 3SLS 2SLS
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.) Coefficient (t-stat.)
Equation 1: Economic Growth
multipleXR -9.273*** (3.48) -6.405*** (2.56)
crisisperyear -1.940*** (3.59) -1.644** (1.96)
gfkf gdp(-1) 0.120** (2.39) 0.025 (0.47)
illit -0.017** (2.12) -0.009 (0.76)
g gov gdp(-1) -2.905 (1.60) -2.871* (1.79)
budbal gdp(-1) -0.094* (1.75) -0.007 (0.14)
civil -0.053 (0.32) 0.007 (0.03)
polright 0.043 (0.35) 0.083 (0.45)
delta tt 0.644 (0.38) 1.039 (0.65)
m2 gdp(-1) 0.005 (0.54) 0.016 (1.07)
open(-1) -0.015 (1.23) -0.048*** (3.23)
inflation(-1) 0.002 (0.68) -0.001 (0.19)
tds x(-1) 0.020 (0.97) -0.019 (1.00)
netres gdp(-1) 1.436 (0.24) 18.370*** (3.20)
intercept 1.963 (0.56) 7.624** (2.22)
P-value 0.000 0.000
Equation 2: Multiple Exchange Rate
gdp pc g -0.023** (2.12) -0.022** (2.01)
currcomplt(-1) 0.002*** (2.89) 0.003*** (3.46)
manufimports(-1) 0.002* (1.68) 0.001 (0.75)
stdebt xdebt(-1) 0.002* (1.77) 0.001 (0.79)
tds x(-1) 0.006*** (4.12) 0.005*** (3.99)
delta tt -0.048 (0.36) -0.049 (0.32)
netres gdp(-1) -0.192 (0.66) -0.132 (0.46)
inflation(-1) 0.001* (1.88) 0.000** (2.33)
g gov gdp(-1) -0.130 (0.91) -0.117 (0.85)
budbal gdp(-1) -0.012*** (2.74) -0.010** (2.52)
intercept -0.010 (0.08) 0.000 (0.00)
P-value 0.000 0.000
Observations 818 818
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors computed.
Variables in italic are the excluded instruments.
37
Table 1.14: Tests of Overidentifying Restrictions
Ho: The excluded instruments are valid
Equation 1: Economic Growth
Hansen J Statistic
χ22 0.014
P-value 0.993
Equation 2: Multiple Exchange Rate
Hansen J Statistic
χ233 168.134
P-value 0.000
Table 1.15: First Stage Regression for Growth Equation
Dependent Variable: multipleXR
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.)
crisisperyear 0.113** (2.46)
gfkf gdp(-1) -0.017*** (5.91)
illit 0.002* (1.76)
g gov gdp(-1) -0.109 (0.84)
budbal gdp(-1) -0.006 (1.52)
civil 0.008 (0.37)
polright 0.003 (0.17)
delta tt -0.060 (0.50)
m2 gdp(-1) 0.002 (1.48)
open(-1) -0.004*** (5.24)
inflation(-1) 0.000* (1.68)
tds x(-1) 0.004*** (3.37)
netres gdp(-1) 1.648*** (5.27)
currcomplt(-1) 0.002** (2.15)
manufimports(-1) 0.005*** (3.11)
stdebt xdebt(-1) 0.004** (2.24)
intercept 0.614** (2.42)
F-test for joint significance of instruments (P-value) 0.000
Observations 818
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors have been computed.
Instrumental variables in italic.
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Table 1.16: First Stage Regression for Multiple Exchange Rate Equation
Dependent Variable: gdp pc g
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.)
currcomplt(-1) -0.012 (1.31)
manufimports(-1) -0.029* (1.82)
stdebt xdebt(-1) -0.026 (1.52)
tds x(-1) -0.048*** (3.51)
delta tt 1.431 (1.14)
netres gdp(-1) 7.665** (2.36)
inflation(-1) -0.004 (1.30)
g gov gdp(-1) -2.163 (1.61)
budbal gdp(-1) 0.036 (0.80)
crisisperyear -2.366*** (4.94)
gfkf gdp(-1) 0.135*** (4.48)
illit -0.020** (2.00)
civil -0.043 (0.20)
polright 0.067 (0.41)
m2 gdp(-1) 0.007 (0.64)
open(-1) -0.025*** (3.46)
intercept 3.625 (1.38)
F-test for joint significance of instruments (P-value) 0.000
Observations 818
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors have been computed.
Instrumental variables in italic.
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Table 1.17: Robustness Analysis
Iterated 3SLS 2SLS with Continuous
with Fixed Effects and Discrete
Endogenous Variables1
Variable Coefficient (t-stat) Coefficient (t-stat)
Equation 1: Economic Growth
multipleXR -6.757** (2.28) -1.971** (2.39)
crisisperyear -1.357*** (2.75) -1.609** (2.32)
gfkf gdp(-1) -0.053 (1.40) 0.002 (0.03)
illit -0.139 (1.31) -0.012 (1.07)
g gov gdp(-1) -2.293* (1.76) -3.229* (1.89)
budbal gdp(-1) -0.061 (1.26) -0.040 (0.68)
civil -0.198 (0.82) -0.027 (0.10)
polright -0.122 (0.62) 0.126 (0.61)
delta tt 1.191 (1.00) 1.103 (0.71)
m2 gdp(-1) -0.059** (2.18) 0.026* (1.67)
open(-1) 0.009 (0.42) -0.062*** (3.13)
inflation(-1) -0.002 (0.62) -0.002 (0.50)
tds x(-1) 0.007 (0.41) -0.012 (0.57)
netres gdp(-1) 22.906*** (4.38) 20.447*** (3.05)
intercept 3.296 (1.50)
P-value 0.000 0.000
Equation 2: Multiple Exchange Rate
gdp pc g -0.021*** (3.16) -0.024* (1.68)
currcomplt(-1) 0.003*** (3.12) 0.003*** (3.06)
manufimports(-1) 0.001 (0.78) 0.001 (0.68)
stdebt xdebt(-1) 0.001 (0.85) 0.001 (0.49)
tds x(-1) 0.006*** (4.15) 0.006*** (3.20)
delta tt -0.052 (0.40) -0.045 (0.29)
netres gdp(-1) -0.149 (0.51) -0.160 (0.41)
inflation(-1) 0.000* (1.81) 0.001* (1.69)
g gov gdp(-1) -0.117 (0.83) -0.121 (0.69)
budbal gdp(-1) -0.010** (2.46) -0.011** (1.99)
intercept 0.011 (0.09)
P-value 0.000 0.000
Observations 818 818
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
1 marginal effects reported for multiple rate equation
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors computed.
Variables in italic are the excluded instruments.
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Chapter 2
Do Multiple Exchange Rates Stop Capital Outflows? Evidence from
Developing Countries
2.1 Introduction
Capital outflows can be a serious problem and may create havoc and turmoil
in economies that have enjoyed the benefits of being capital importers. When facing
a situation like this, policymakers are tempted to impose capital controls to avoid
or ameliorate a crisis and to prevent capital from flying out. In this chapter I look
at a special case of capital controls on outflows: Multiple exchange rate systems.
Multiple exchange rate systems segment the foreign currency market so that
different exchange rates apply to different types of transactions. When multiple
exchange rates are in place, the government sets an official or preferential exchange
rate for some -or all- current account transactions, and creates a parallel flexible
exchange rate, at a higher value for capital account transactions. So, if there is
a run against the local currency or a shock to the capital account, the parallel
rate depreciates automatically without affecting the domestic price of imports, and
without forcing the Central Bank to lose reserves or increase interest rates. The
main objective is to stop capital flight1.
1“...Even in a crisis, it may be preferable to adopt a dual-exchange-rate-system, which maintains
a relatively fixed exchange rate for current account transactions and a floating rate for speculative
financial transactions. Such a system has the advantage of allowing the exchange rate to respond to
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The effectiveness of capital controls has been largely questioned in academia
and policy circles, because it is not clear that they achieve the goals they are intended
for. Theoretical models predict a lot of benefits from free capital mobility, but capital
flow reversal episodes raise the possibility that the costs of free capital mobility are
too high compared to the potential benefits (Kose and Prasad (2004)).
This chapter contributes to the debate by measuring the impact of multiple
rates on capital flows in developing countries for the 1980-2001 period. Using instru-
mental variables and dynamic panel data techniques to handle endogeneity problems
and unobserved country effects, it finds that multiple exchange rates systems have
at best no effect on net capital outflows. At worst, the chapter finds that parallel
exchange rate systems increase net capital outflows rather than stop them. This
result suggests that when policymakers segment the foreign exchange market in the
heels of a financial crisis, they may exacerbate the crisis instead of alleviating it.
This can be the optimal response of a government with few sources of fiscal revenue
available besides foreign capital taxation.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the recent literature
on the effects of capital controls on capital flows. Section 2.3 proposes a theoretical
explanation due to Bartolini and Drazen (1997) and Drazen (1997) to rationalize the
possibility that controlling capital outflows may reduce net capital inflows. Section
2.4 explores the data and shows some preliminary results and stylized facts that
motivate this chapter. It also takes an event study approach to examine net capital
fluctuations in speculative supplies and demands for foreign exchange. The exchange rate response,
being an equilibrating price signal, tends to reduce speculation.”, John T. Cuddington, in Capital
Flight, Estimates, Issues and Explanations, Princeton Studies in International Finance, (1986).
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flows behavior before and after default, currency and banking crises. Section 2.5
develops and explains the econometric methodology employed to quantify the effect
of multiple exchange rates systems on net capital flows, and presents the estimation
results. Finally section 2.6 discusses some concluding remarks and future extensions.
2.2 Multiple Exchange Rates and Capital Flows: What DoWe Know?
The benefit of free capital mobility is one of the most controversial and unset-
tled issues within the international finance literature. Theory mentions many bene-
fits from having an open capital account. For example, Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose
(2004) distinguish between direct and indirect benefits from financial integration.
By direct benefits they list “the augmentation of domestic savings, reduction in the
cost of capital through better global allocation of risk, transfer of technological and
managerial know-how and stimulation of domestic financial sector development”.
By indirect benefits they consider the “promotion of specialization, commitment to
better economic policies and signaling”. However, the authors also remark that is
has not been possible so far to establish an empirical robust relationship between
financial integration and economic performance.
But all that glitters is not gold. Second generation models of currency crisis
predict that it is possible that countries may suffer capital outflows or currency
crises, even if they have strong fundamentals, raising the issue of potential threats
from not having some kind of capital controls. Because of capital market imperfec-
tions (like asymmetric information), foreign investors may pull their investments out
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from a country, triggering a crisis, even if macroeconomic fundamentals are sound.
The literature also shows that herd behavior can make things even worse (Gale
(1996)). For example, the contagion literature shows that the financial channel may
become important in spreading shocks from one country to another (Calvo (1999),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and (2001)). In that sense, capital controls may
place “sand in the wheels of market discipline” (Tobin (1978)), by stopping capital
outflows and reducing the likelihood of a crisis and hence macroeconomic volatility.
Furthermore, Kaminsky, Reinhart and Ve´gh (2004) show that capital flows are pro-
cyclical, implying that capital outflows amplify the potential damage of a negative
shock, a phenomenon that the authors label as “when it rains, it pours”.
The nineties witnessed a dramatic surge in capital flows to emerging market
countries (Ferna´ndez-Arias and Montiel (1996)) that posed significant challenges
to policymakers. Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1994) argue that capital inflows
were “associated with inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation, a de-
terioration in the current account and a boom in bank lending”. Policymakers were
concerned about the potential devastating effects of capital flows reversals, espe-
cially if capital flows were short term (hot money). Reinhart and Smith (1997)
document how some countries resorted to controls on capital inflows as a way to tilt
the composition of capital flows from short term to long term flows, in an attempt
to decrease the likelihood of capital flows reversals.
The eruption of the East Asian crisis also contributed to the debate of whether
or not there should be capital controls. At that time, Krugman (1998) said that it
was “time to get radical” and impose capital controls when the IMF rescue packages’
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results were disappointing in his view. Bhagwati (1998) said that the benefits from
free capital mobility “have not been yet demonstrated”. Stiglitz (2003) blamed
capital account liberalization as “the single most important factor leading to the
crisis”. To cope with the Asian crisis, Malaysia imposed controls on capital outflows
and recovered quickly from it (Kaplan and Rodrick (2001)). To prevent contagion,
Chile imposed controls on capital inflows. But capital controls in general, and foreign
exchange controls specifically, are not things of the past. The recent financial crises
in Argentina (2002), Uruguay (2002) and Venezuela (2003) have brought to the
forefront the question of the optimality of capital controls as a policy tool to stop
capital outflows. For example Argentina (2002) and Venezuela (2003) have recently
imposed restrictions on foreign exchange.
The empirical literature presents mixed results on the effectiveness of capital
controls (Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002)) although most “empirical studies
lack a common methodology” (Magud and Reinhart (2005))2. Prasad, Rumbaugh
and Wang (2005) argue that the Latin American experience in the 1980s “demon-
strates that capital controls have generally not been very effective in restricting
capital outflows”. Tamirisa (2004) reports negligible effects of capital controls on
exchange rates in Malaysia. Kaplan and Rodrick (2001) argue that the Malaysian
capital controls program was successful if it is compared with the Thai and Korean
performance after going to the IMF for assistance. Edison and Reinhart (1999) find
that the Malaysian capital controls program improved interest rate and exchange
2Magud and Reinhart (2005) identify three additional problems that are present in the capital
controls literature: The absence of a “unified framework to analyze the macroeconomic conse-
quences of controls, the significant heterogeneity across countries and time in the controls measures
implemented and the multiple definitions of what constitutes a “success””.
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rate stability. Forbes (2004) surveys the empirical literature that evaluates the ef-
fects of capital controls using micro data. She discusses empirical research done for
Malaysia (Johnson and Mitton (2002)) and Chile (Forbes (2003)), among others.
She argues that during the Asian crisis the Malaysian capital controls program “re-
duced market discipline and provided a shelter for government cronyism”; she also
argues that the Chilean capital controls program “made it relatively more difficult
and expensive for smaller companies to raise financing”. Because of the costs as-
sociated with capital controls, she concludes that capital controls are not “sand”
but “mud in the wheels of market discipline”. Edwards (1999) claims that capital
controls are ineffective, become permanent and foster corruption. He also claims
that the Chilean capital controls program increased the cost of capital for small
and medium size firms. Avella´n (2005) looks at the persistence of capital controls
and estimates the transition probabilities between periods with and without capital
controls. He finds that capital controls are very persistent. Magud and Reinhart
(2005) also observe that temporary capital controls sometimes become permanent.
They raise the point that even temporary capital controls may have a permanent
impact on the economy because they signal governments’ preferences toward capital
mobility in times of distress. The link between the persistence and the effective-
ness of capital controls has also received some attention. Rogoff (2002) asserts that
“capital controls often breed corruption” and that their effectiveness fades over time.
Prasad, Rumbaugh and Wang (2005) agree with this last point.
The international finance literature calls “impossible trinity” the trilemma pol-
icymakers face when they cannot simultaneously set a fixed exchange rate regime,
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an open capital account and an exogenous monetary policy. (When countries im-
plement capital controls with an inflexible exchange rate system, they are trying to
get room to use monetary policy as a tool to affect economic activity). Multiple
exchange rates systems constitute an alternative, where countries try to have all
the three policy options available. They still have some sort of fixed exchange rate
regime for current account transactions, they use monetary policy actively, and the
capital account is still open in the sense that quantitative restrictions on capital
outflows are absent. In fact, capital can still leave, but it will be punished in the
parallel market with a higher exchange rate, which will likely float and adjust to
curb speculative pressures.
Ghei, Kiguel and O’Connell (1997) question the effectiveness of parallel ex-
change rates. They conclude that their ability to insulate countries from shocks
fades over time. They also report that parallel exchange rates systems typically
hide structural fiscal problems that ultimately result in higher parallel premiums,
and in traumatic unifications. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) show that it is almost
a rule that multiple exchange rate systems end in traumatic devaluation episodes
that precede the foreign exchange market unification. Kamin (1997) studies multi-
ple exchange rates in Argentina from 1982 to 1989. He claims that the government
chose controls without implementing a fiscal adjustment, deepening the crisis that
ended in the hyperinflation of the late 80’s. Kaminsky (1997) studies the Mexi-
can experience with parallel rates from 1982 to 1987, and evaluates their ability to
insulate domestic prices. She finds that the dual exchange rate system failed to insu-
late domestic prices. She also finds that parallel exchange rate systems didn’t have
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any effect on capital outflows. Avella´n (2005) reports that multiple exchange rate
systems hurt economic performance, measured by annual GDP per capita growth.
The question of the effectiveness of capital controls is empirical in nature,
because theory predicts ambiguous results, and the evidence so far is inconclusive.
In the next sections I will concentrate on multiple exchange rate systems and their
impact on capital flows.
2.3 Why Parallel Rates Might Trigger Capital Outflows?: The “Sig-
naling Effect”
As stated earlier, parallel exchange rate systems constitute a form of capital
control on outflows. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) and Drazen (1997) develop a model
that may explain why capital controls on outflows could increase capital flight. In
their contribution they originally study why capital account liberalization policies
trigger capital inflows, but their model is also useful to study the effects of capital
controls. Their main message is that current policy decisions are important because
they signal the type of decisions the government will take in the future.
Their argument goes as follows. Suppose that the government chooses in ev-
ery period whether it will allow free capital mobility or set capital controls before
investors make their investment decisions. If the government imposes capital con-
trols in any period, it suffers the fixed cost ξ. Suppose also that the government
has a good reason to set capital controls, for example, to widen its tax base as was
originally assumed by Drazen. Assume that the government’s preferences for capital
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u
u
u
Inherited stock of capital K0t=0
Outside funds x are revealed privately to the government
government chooses controls policy c1={Unrestricted, Restricted}
Productivity shock A1 is realized and revealed
Investors choose K1 (with K1 ≥ K0 if c1 = R)
Production takes place, profits are collected
t=1
x is revealed to the public
government chooses controls policy c2={Unrestricted, Restricted}
Productivity shock A2 is realized and revealed
Investors choose K2 (with K2 ≥ K1 if c2 = R)
Production takes place, profits are collected, taxes are paid
Government delivers public good and gets payoffW =W (τK2+x)
t=2
Figure 2.1: Drazen’s (1997) Model Sequencing
controls is private information in t=1, but is revealed to investors in t=2. After the
government announces its capital mobility policy for a given period, a productivity
shock arrives, agents make their investment decision and production takes place. In
the last period the government taxes existing capital and receives its payoff. Fig-
ure 2.1 reproduces the sequencing of events in Drazen’s model. A more detailed
exposition of this model is located in the appendix.
The existence of asymmetric information regarding the government’s type in-
duces investors to look at current policy choices to form an expectation about what
policymakers will decide in the future. The belief about the likelihood of observing
capital controls enables investors to form an expectation on the return they will
get if they decide to invest in the domestic economy. When agents make their in-
vestment decisions, they compare the expected return from the domestic economy
to the return they would get in international markets. If the government chooses
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market friendly policies (without capital controls), it is likely that it will continue
to choose them in the future (current good policy signals future good policy), and
hence capital flows will increase. This is the standard statement to explain why
capital account liberalization triggers capital inflows. By the same token, if the
government chooses capital controls, it is more likely it will continue to do so in the
future, so the expected return on domestic capital will decrease and hence foreign
assets will become more attractive. Equation (A.10) in the appendix shows formally
how an increase in the likelihood of observing capital controls leads to a reduction
in capital flows.
The “signaling effect” is an appealing story that rationalizes why capital con-
trols may increase capital outflows. Empirical evidence supports this result. Glick
and Hutchison (2000) examine whether capital controls on outflows, aimed at stop-
ping hot money, are effective or just signal “bad policy”. They find that restrictions
to capital mobility increase the probability of a speculative attack to the domes-
tic currency. This result suggests that restrictions on capital mobility send a bad
signal, making the economy more vulnerable to a currency crisis. However, this
study didn’t consider the endogeneity of the capital mobility policy or unobserved
time-invariant country heterogeneity. Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997) study the deter-
minants of capital flows to Brazil, explicitly considering the endogeneity of capital
controls. They find that capital controls change the composition and volume of capi-
tal flows. Avella´n (2005) also explicitly considers the endogeneity of capital controls.
He studies the effects of multiple exchange rates on economic performance, measured
by GDP per capita growth. He finds that parallel exchange rates reduce economic
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performance, as the signaling literature predicts.
2.4 Crises, Parallel Rates and Capital Outflows: A First Pass at the
Data
The data sources for this chapter are Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) appendix,
the International Financial Statistics, the World Economic Outlook and the World
Economic Indicators databases. The data frequency is annual.
First, to establish some basic stylized facts I split net capital flows3 data be-
tween periods with and without parallel rates. I have 1,116 observations for 46
countries from 1974 to 2001. Figure 2.2 plots their densities. The distribution for
the net capital flows/GDP ratio with multiple exchange rates is shifted to the left,
suggesting that countries with multiple rates experience lower average net capital
flows as a fraction of their GDP than countries with unitary exchange rates. The fig-
ure also shows that the distribution of net capital flows/GDP with unitary exchange
rates has fatter tails than the capital flows distribution with multiple exchange rates,
indicating that capital flows are more volatile without parallel exchange rate sys-
tems. Table 2.1 corroborates this observations. It displays descriptive statistics for
the net capital flows-GDP ratio and shows that mean net capital flows as a fraction
of GDP are equal to -0.005% for the multiple rates case and equal to 1.49% for the
other. More formally, I reject in Table 2.2 the hypothesis that mean capital flows
are equal with and without multiple rates at the 1% significance level. Table 2.1 also
3In this chapter positive capital flows correspond to capital inflows, whereas negative flows to
capital outflows.
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shows that the capital flows/GDP ratio is more volatile with unitary exchange rates
(a standard deviation of 5.74) than with parallel rates (4.34). I reject in Table 2.3
the hypothesis that the capital flows/GDP ratio has the same standard deviation
with and without parallel rates at the 1% significance level.
Figure 2.2: Net Capital Flows/GDP Density. Sample of 46 countries, 1,116 obser-
vations, 1974-2001.
Next, I look at the behavior of capital flows around crisis periods, adopting an
event-study approach. If multiple rates are a successful instrument to stop capital
outflows, then countries with parallel rates should not experience significant capital
outflows in crisis periods. To explore this point I look at average and median capital
flows as a fraction of GDP in six year windows centered around crisis episodes. A
natural question is then how to define a crisis episode. To make the study as com-
prehensive as possible, I use six crises definitions that are common in the literature.
These definitions include different measures of currency crisis, default crisis and
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banking crisis4. To make countries comparable, I take away any “country effect” by
demeaning the capital flows series by country for each crisis episode.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 plot average and median capital flows/GDP ratios for all
six crises definitions. It seems that there is no beneficial impact on the behavior of
the capital flows/GDP ratio with multiple exchange rates when facing debt crises,
currency crises or banking crises, although it seems that there might be some gains
in terms of volatility.
The descriptive analysis taken so far does not prove that multiple exchange
rates decrease capital flows. Estimating the effects of multiple exchange rate sys-
tems on capital outflows is not an easy task because of simultaneity problems. For
example, it is possible that once countries experience capital outflows, they impose
multiple exchange rate systems to stop them; but it is also possible that the intro-
duction of multiple exchange rates signals international investors that worse times
are coming (bad policy signaling), so they run for safer assets abroad. To establish a
causal link from multiple exchange rates to capital flows it is necessary to explicitly
deal with this endogeneity problem. To the best of my knowledge, very few studies
have taken this point into consideration.
Data availability reduces the sample for the econometric study to 518 obser-
vations including 46 developing countries for the 1980-2001 period. In this sample
20 countries switch from multiple exchange rate systems to unified exchange rates,
13 countries switch from unified exchange rates to parallel exchange rate systems,
4The crisis definitions adopted in this chapter are: default crisis ( Standard & Poor), debt crises
(Detriagache & Spilimbergo), currency crisis (Kaminsky & Reinhart), banking crisis (Kaminky &
Reinhart), (Caprio & Klingbiel) and (IMF).
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Figure 2.3: Capital Flows/GDP (Averages) and Crisis
15 countries never segment their foreign exchange market, 6 countries always expe-
rience parallel exchange rates and 8 countries experience more than one transition.
Within this last group of countries, 2 countries switch back to parallel rates, 4 coun-
tries switch back to unified rates and 2 countries experience three transitions, from
multiple to unified rates.
In the next section I will measure the impact of parallel exchange rates on
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Figure 2.4: Capital Flows/GDP (Medians) and Crisis
capital outflows using instrumental variables and dynamic panel data techniques to
address reverse causality problems, among other things.
2.5 Empirical Methodology and Estimation Results
To assess the effectiveness of multiple rates in stopping capital outflows, I
estimate a capital flow equation using annual data for 45 developing countries, in
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the 1980-2001 period. The specification for the capital flows equation follows the
pull and push factors literature. Montiel and Reinhart (1999) define pull factors
as “factors that operate through improvements in the risk-return characteristics
of assets issued by developing-country debtors...” and push factors as “those that
operate by reducing the attractiveness of lending to industrial country debtors.”
The capital flows equation I estimate is:
cfi,t = γ0 + γ1pulli,t + γ2pushi,t + εi,t (2.1)
where cfi,t is net capital flows for country i in period t as a fraction of its
GDP, γ0 is a constant term, γ1 is a row vector of parameters to estimate, pulli,t is a
column vector of pull factors, γ2 is a row vector of parameters to estimate, pushi,t
is a column vector of push factors, εi,t is an independent and identically distributed
disturbance term.
As pull factors I use the terms of trade index, the output gap, the annual
domestic return (devaluation adjusted) on bank deposits, the inflation rate, govern-
ment’s primary balance as a fraction of GDP, openness, institutional quality, net
foreign reserves as fraction of GDP and the number of currency crises in a year.
To measure the presence of multiple exchange rate systems I specify a dichotomous
variable (multipleXR) that is equal to one if a country has had multiple exchange
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rates for at least 6 months in a given year5, and zero otherwise6. As push factors
I use the industrial production indices and government short-term bond yields for
the US and the UK7. A full description of the regressors is in the appendix.
The main (and often ignored) problem to estimate the effect of parallel rates
on capital flows is the reverse causality between multiple exchange rates and capital
flows. I use two different techniques to estimate this effect consistently. First I
use two stages least squares (2SLS). The main challenge with this approach is to
think about possible “external” instruments than can be excluded from the capital
flow equation, and that are relevant to the imposition of multiple exchange rate
systems. Second, I use the dynamic panel data estimator (DPD) introduced by
Arellano and Bond (1991), and extended by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell
and Bond (1998). In this approach it is necessary to make an assumption about
the disturbance’s serial correlation process in the capital flows equation. Then
the estimator uses lags of the dependent and explanatory variables as “internal”
instruments for the endogenous variables.
Additionally, I assume that the pull factors, except the terms of trade, are en-
dogenous. I provide an economic explanation of this assumption in the DPD section
below. I also assume that the push factors are strictly exogenous. This is a plausi-
ble assumption because developing countries are considered small, and idiosyncratic
shocks to capital flows should not have any link with advanced economies’ produc-
5The results do not change if I consider a different threshold.
6The source of this data is the appendix for Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) “A Modern History of
Exchange Rates”.
7Lines 11160c and 11261 in the International Financial Statistics. I use short term rates because
they are more sensible to changes in the economic environment.
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tion or interest rates, or worldwide commodity prices, at any lead or lag.
An Instrumental Variables Approach
In this section I use 2SLS to measure the causal impact of multiple exchange
rate systems on capital flows. To isolate the endogeneity of multiple exchange rate
systems and to avoid additional simultaneity problems, all the pull factors except
the terms of trade and the multiple exchange rates variable have been lagged one
period8.
As discussed in Chapter 1, countries that choose to introduce multiple ex-
change rates systems fear that a unified devaluation might trigger an inflation spike
or countrywide bankruptcies because of balance sheet effects due to liability dollar-
ization. I will use the shares of manufactures and fuel in total imports as instru-
ments, because countries with higher shares are more likely to implement multiple
exchange rate systems due to the fact that they would suffer a higher pass-through
effect if they implemented a unified devaluation9. To capture the balance sheet ef-
fect, I will use as instrument the share of foreign debt denominated is US dollars
and I will use the share of short term debt in external debt as a measure of liquidity
risk. These two variables capture the liability dollarization channel and the liquidity
8A similar econometric strategy, but in a different context, is followed by Calvo, Izquierdo and
Mej´ıa (2004), Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2003), Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettelmeyer
(2001), among others. The DPD section presents an alternative technique to deal with the endo-
geneity of the pull factors.
9Bailliu and Bouakez (2004) argue that “the extent to which those changes (changes in import
prices due to exchange rate movements) are reflected in the consumer price index (CPI) depends on
the share of imports in the consumption basket”. Data on the share of imports in the consumption
basket is not available, so I use the shares of manufactures and fuel in total imports as proxies.
See Campa and Goldberg (2002) and Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a discussion on why the
degree of pass-though differs across countries and across time.
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risk that may push firms into insolvency if a unified devaluation takes place. When
countries’ external debt maturity is short, and when the currency mismatch in lia-
bilities is high, segmenting the foreign exchange market becomes attractive because
the impact of the devaluation on firms’ balance sheets would not be as high as if the
devaluation were unitary. To make sure that the instruments have no direct effect
on capital flows, I lag them one period. Then, the underlying exclusion restriction
is that the one period lags of the instruments have no impact on capital flows other
than their indirect effect through the segmentation of the foreign exchange market.
Estimation Results
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results for equation (2.1). The OLS estimates
suggest that having multiple exchange rate systems reduces capital flows by 2.2% of
GDP, and is significant at the 1% level. However, as stated previously, this result is
contaminated by reverse causality, affecting OLS consistency. The 2SLS estimates
suggest then that parallel exchange rate systems reduce capital flows by 4.5% of
GDP at the 10% significance level. I also find that good fiscal performance (budbal)
increases net capital inflows by 0.17% of GDP at the 1% significance level, while
currency crisis (crisisperyear) decreases net capital flows by 1.97% of GDP at the
1% significance level . Table 2.6 shows the results for the first stage regression. The
instruments are jointly significant, and three out of four instruments are individually
significant. The first stage results suggest that the degree of currency mismatch
(liability dollarization), measured by the currency composition of long term debt, is
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positively related to the likelihood of observing parallel rates. The share of fuel in
total imports and the share of short term debt in external debt are significant but
with negative sign. Notice that there is overidentification when I estimate equation
(2.1) by 2SLS because there are four instruments and just one endogenous variable.
The overidentifying restriction test in Table 2.5 shows that I fail to reject the validity
of the instruments.
As an additional specification test, I re-estimate equation (2.1) but adding 2
leads and 2 lags of the multiple exchange rates measure. This approach is a kind
of specification test because if multiple rates are having a causal impact on net
capital flows, the effects should not show up until after the regime changes10. So if
the instruments are valid, there shouldn’t be any significant lead effect. Table 2.7
displays the estimation results and shows that the lead effects are not significant.
The 2SLS procedure to this point has estimated the first stage regression using
plain OLS11. Maddala (1983) suggests a modification to this procedure when the
endogenous variable is dichotomous, as is the case here. His suggestion consists in
instrumenting the controls measure using a probit model, and then using the fitted
values in the capital flows equation. The fifth and sixth columns in Table 2.5 show
the estimation results from applying this method and indicate that parallel exchange
rate systems have no impact on capital outflows.
The results obtained so far with instrumental variables reveal that multiple
10I would like to thank John Shea for suggesting this approach.
11This is equivalent to say that I have used a linear probability model in the first stage regression
to estimate the likelihood of observing parallel exchange rates. The main shortcoming of the linear
probability model is that the predicted probabilities are not constrained to be within the [0,1]
interval.
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exchange rate systems are ineffective at best at stopping capital outflows12, and at
worst they might increase capital outflows.
A Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) Approach
In this section I will use DPD estimators to look further into the effective-
ness of multiple exchange rates systems. In particular, this technique allows me
to handle the endogeneity of the pull factors explicitly because the DPD estima-
tor instruments for all endogenous variables in the model. Besides, DPD lets me
consider a richer dynamic framework, in which there might be some persistence in
capital flows together with country specific effects. Then, the capital flow equation
I estimate is:
cfi,t = γ0 + γ1pulli,t + γ2pushi,t + ηi + υi,t
υi,t = ρυi,t−1 + εi,t (2.2)
| ρ |< 1
where cfi,t are net capital flows for country i in period t as a fraction of its
GDP, γ1 is a row vector of parameters to estimate, pulli,t is a column vector of pull
factors, γ2 is a row vector of parameters to estimate, pushi,t is a column vector of
push factors, ηi is an unobserved country specific effect, υi,t is a disturbance that may
be serially correlated and εi,t is a disturbance term. I assume that ηi ∼ iid(0, σ2η)
12This result doesn’t change if I introduce country fixed effects.
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and εi,t ∼ iid(0, σ2ε) across i and t. I also assume that εi,t and ηi are independent of
each other.
This model has a dynamic representation as in (2.3):
cfi,t = (1− ρ)γ0 + γ1pulli,t − ργ1pulli,t−1 + γ2pushi,t − ργ2pushi,t−1 + ρcfi,t−1 + ωi,t
ωi,t = (1− ρ)ηi + εi,t (2.3)
or
cfi,t = pi0 + pi1pulli,t + pi2pulli,t−1 + pi3pushi,t + pi4pushi,t−1 + pi5cfi,t−1 + ωi,t
ωi,t = η
∗
i + εi,t (2.4)
where (1− ρ)γ0 ≡ pi0 and (1− ρ)ηi ≡ η∗i .
Equation (2.4) uses less information than equation (2.3) because it does not
reflect the parameter restrictions. The estimation of equation (2.4) has at least two
complications. First, the assumption about the endogeneity of the current value
of the pull factors results in time varying correlation between the disturbance term
and the pull factors so that E[pulli,t · εi,t] 6= 0. This could be the case if, for
instance, an increase in capital inflows translates into an increase in foreign reserves
and domestic inflation, as would happen under a highly managed exchange rate
regime. It could also be the case that central banks may want to sterilize capital
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inflows by increasing domestic interest rates. Second, the country specific effect is
correlated with the endogenous right hand side variables, so that E[pulli,t · η∗i ] 6= 0
and E[η∗i · cfi,t−1] 6= 0. Using OLS under these circumstances results in inconsistent
estimates. Because of these problems, I take the first difference of equation (2.4) to
remove the country specific effect and obtain the following expression:
∆cfi,t = pi1∆pulli,t + pi2∆pulli,t−1 + pi3∆pushi,t + pi4∆pushi,t−1 + pi5∆cfi,t−1 +∆ωi,t
∆ωi,t = εi,t − εi,t−1 (2.5)
Equation (2.5) is the main estimating equation. However, notice that ∆ωi,t is
correlated with ∆cfi,t−1 and notice also that the pull factors’ endogeneity problem
remains unsolved13. Therefore, using OLS to estimate equation (2.5) produces in-
consistent estimates. Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) show
large sample results for a GMM procedure to estimate dynamic panel data models
like the one presented above. Their estimator uses suitable lags of the explanatory
and dependent variables as “internal” instruments to estimate equation (2.5). This
estimator is known as the “Difference GMM” estimator.
Nevertheless, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this estimator has poor
small sample properties when the instruments are “weak”. They show that this
happens when the processes of the explanatory variables are highly persistent or
are close to a random walk. Blundell and Bond (1998) solve this problem adding
13It can be shown that E[∆ωi,t ·∆pulli,t] 6= 0 and that E[∆ωi,t ·∆pulli,t−1] 6= 0.
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extra orthogonality conditions to the “Difference GMM” estimation14. This addi-
tional moment conditions rely on a set of stationarity assumptions, and exploit the
orthogonality between the first differences of the explanatory variables and the dis-
turbance term in equation (2.4). This extended estimator is known as the “System
GMM” estimator.
It is important to highlight that the assumption regarding the autoregressive
order of the disturbance term in equation (2.2) is fundamental to estimate equation
(2.5) consistently with DPD. If υi,t’s autoregressive order is greater than 1, the model
would be misspecified and the estimates would not be consistent. Fortunately, I can
statistically test this assumption to make sure that the model is correctly specified.
Then, if υi,t has first order serial correlation, the push factors are exogenous
and the pull factors are endogenous, the following orthogonality conditions hold:
E[pushi,s · (εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 (2.6)
t ≥ 2,∀s
i = 1, 2, . . . N
14Blundell and Bond (1998B) apply this method to the estimation of production functions for
the US manufacturing sector.
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Also,
E[pulli,t−s · (εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 (2.7)
E[cfi,t−s · (εi,t − εi,t−1)] = 0 (2.8)
t = 3, 4, . . . T
s = 2, 3, . . . T
i = 1, 2, . . . N
E[∆pushi,t−1 · (η∗i + εi,t)] = 0 (2.9)
E[∆pulli,t−1 · (η∗i + εi,t)] = 0 (2.10)
E[∆cfi,t−1 · (η∗i + εi,t)] = 0 (2.11)
t = 3, 4, . . . T
i = 1, 2, . . . N
Note that (2.8) follows from (2.6) and (2.7), and (2.11) follows from (2.9)
and (2.10). To compute the “Difference GMM” estimator I use the orthogonality
conditions given by equations (2.6) to (2.8), and to compute the “System GMM”
estimator I use the moment conditions given by equations (2.6) to (2.11). The first
condition comes from the push factors’ exogeneity. The second and third conditions
are a consequence of the first order serial correlation assumption on υi,t and the
pull factors’ endogeneity. The remaining orthogonality conditions hold under the
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following stationarity assumptions:
E[pulli,t+p · η∗i ] = E[pulli,t+q · η∗i ] (2.12)
E[pushi,t+p · η∗i ] = E[pushi,t+q · η∗i ] (2.13)
E[cfi,t+p · η∗i ] = E[cfi,t+q · η∗i ] (2.14)
∀p, q
Where (2.12) and (2.13) imply (2.14).
The “Difference GMM” and the “System GMM” estimators must pass two
crucial tests to make sure that the estimates are consistent. First, the instruments
I am using should be valid. Notice that there is overidentification because the num-
ber of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables. Arellano and Bond
suggest the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions to test if the instruments are
valid. The literature shows that the Sargan statistic is not robust to heteroskedas-
ticity or autocorrelation (Hayashi 2000), so I present the Hansen J statistic for the
overidentifying restrictions test, which is robust. Second, if the model is correctly
specified the disturbance term in (2.5) should not have second order serial correla-
tion (notice that by construction first order correlation is expected). If I reject the
null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation, it indicates that I am using as
instruments lags of the explanatory variables that in fact are endogenous. Then I
should include more lags of the explanatory variables, and of the dependent variable
as well, in equation (2.4) to correctly specify the model.
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Estimation Results
The results for the “Difference GMM” and the “System GMM” estimators
appear in Table 2.8. First, notice that as expected for both estimators, I reject
the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation at the 5% and 1% significance
levels. Second, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation,
which denotes that the model has been correctly specified. I also fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid. All these results imply that I am
consistently estimating the model.
The Difference GMM estimation finds that multiple rates decrease capital
flows by 2.3% of GDP at the 5% significance level. This implies that the adoption
of these type of capital controls is not only ineffective, but harmful, because it
increases capital outflows. Economic turmoil also reduces capital flows. Currency
crises increase capital outflows by 1.4% of GDP. Higher domestic returns have a
positive -though small- impact on capital flows. The estimate of ρ, which measures
capital flows persistence, is positive and significant at the 1% level.
As noted earlier, Difference GMM could have poor performance in small sam-
ples if the instrument series are persistent. To check the robustness of the results
obtained so far, the third and fourth columns in Table 2.8 display the results for
the System GMM estimation. The main findings are that multiple exchange rate
systems decrease capital flows by 1.9% of GDP, and that currency crises also reduce
capital flows, but by 1.3% of GDP. The autocorrelation coefficient for capital flows
is positive and significant at the 1% level.
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The results obtained using DPD suggest that multiple exchange rate systems
trigger capital outflows, rather than stopping them. This result is robust to endo-
geneity, and to the presence of unobserved country effects.
2.6 Chapter 2: Conclusions
In this chapter I measure the effectiveness of multiple exchange rates systems
as a tool to stop capital outflows, considering explicitly the endogeneity of capital
controls. I look at 46 developing countries in the 1980-2001 period. The main re-
sult is that multiple exchange rates are an ineffective tool to stop capital outflows.
A first pass at the data suggests that countries with multiple exchange rates have
lower capital flows on average than countries with unitary exchange rates. Pre-
liminary evidence proposes that capital flows are more volatile in countries where
the exchange rate is unitary in contrast with countries with parallel exchange rate
systems. I also look at capital flows dynamics with and without parallel exchange
rates systems before and after debt, currency and banking crisis episodes. In all
cases, I cannot find compelling support for the claim that multiple exchange rates
stop capital outflows. For every kind of crisis, capital flows recurrently decline in
crisis periods, though it seems that capital flows swings are less pronounced with
multiple exchange rates.
Using a more rigorous econometric framework, I find that, at best, multiple
exchange rates have no impact on capital flows. At worst, the evidence suggests that
parallel exchange rate systems trigger capital outflows instead of stopping them.
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This last result could be rationalized with a standard signaling model for capital
controls.
The policy implication of the estimation results, is that policymakers should
be aware that segmenting the foreign exchange market will reinforce capital outflows
rather than stop them.
This chapter can be extended in a number of ways. Section 2.4 presents some
preliminary descriptive evidence that capital flows are less volatile under multiple
exchange rate systems. A potential extension is to take this point further and
measure the impact of parallel exchange rates on capital flows volatility, considering
not only the endogeneity of parallel exchange rates, but also the relationship between
capital flows’ mean and volatility. This is an interesting approach because there
seems to exist a tradeoff between enjoying higher capital flows but with with higher
volatility, or having lower capital flows but with less volatility.
Another research avenue to explore is the role of contagion. This chapter
has not considered the possibility that the imposition of parallel exchange rates
spills over from one country to another as countries get hit by shocks to the capital
account. Capital flows reversals may be spatially correlated, and hence it may pay
off to look at the effects of multiple exchange rates under this perspective.
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2.7 Appendix
Appendix I: Drazen’s (1997) Capital Controls Model
In this section I present a detailed exposition of Drazen’s (1997) model, which
is the theoretical framework that supports some of the empirical results presented
in this chapter15. Assume that there are 2 periods. In each period, risk neutral in-
vestors have to decide whether or not to invest their capital in international markets
and get the return given by the international interest rate r, or invest in the domestic
technology given by equation (A.1) and earn the marginal product of capital.
Yt = AtK
α
t , 0 < α ≤ 1, t = 1, 2 (A.1)
Output is subject to the productivity shock At. It is assumed that At can
take two possible values: A with probability pi and 0 with probability 1− pi, where
A > 0. The government chooses its capital mobility policy, ct, which may be either
restricted (capital controls, R) or unrestricted (free capital mobility, U).
The timing of events for the model is reproduced in Figure 2.1 from Drazen
(1997), and is as follows. In period one, the government learns privately its type
x²{xl, xh} where xl < xh and where x captures exogenous fiscal revenue available
besides capital taxation. The government chooses its capital mobility policy c1.
Then the productivity shock A1 arrives, investment decisions take place, production
occurs according to (A.1) and profits are collected. At the beginning of period
15For a general version of this model see Bartolini and Drazen (1997), where they consider a
continuum of types, and more general functional forms as well. Drazen (1997) builds on Bartolini
and Drazen (1997) and delivers a more tractable model. I use the latter in this section.
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two, government’s type is revealed to investors. Next, the government decides its
capital mobility policy c2, followed by the productivity shock. Then investors make
their investment decisions, and production occurs. At the end of period two, the
government levies a proportional publicly known tax τ over the existing capital
stock, spends τK2 + x and derives utility W (τK2 + x) where W (·) is a standard
concave utility function. Investors discount profits at the rate ρ. If the government
imposes capital controls in any period, it suffers the fixed cost ξ.
The model is solved backwards. In the last period investors get the return
1 + r if they invest abroad, or they get αA2K
α−1
2 + (1 − τ), the marginal product
of capital plus the after tax capital stock , if they choose the local technology and
if A2 = A
16. Under free capital mobility, risk neutral international investors will
invest domestically until the point that both marginal returns are equalized, as in
equation (A.2)
1 + r = αA2K
α−1
2 + (1− τ) (A.2)
Solving (A.2) for K2 provides the expression for second period capital stock
under free capital mobility, as a function of the second period productivity shock.
K2(A2) =
(
αA2
r + τ
) 1
1−α
(A.3)
If the government imposes capital controls in t=2, the second period capital
16If there is a bad productivity shock (A2 = 0) in the domestic economy, investors will setK2 = 0
and will invest all of their resources in the riskless international technology.
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stock will be constrained by
K2 ≥ K1 (A.4)
Next, the government chooses its capital mobility policy before observing the
realization of A2. When making its decision, the government chooses the policy that
yields the highest expected payoff. Letting ψ2(K1, x) be the difference between the
expected payoff from setting capital controls and the expected payoff from setting
free capital mobility, then:
ψ2(K1, x) ≡ E2[W (τK2 + x)|K1, c2 = R]− ξ − E2[W (τK2 + x)|K1, c2 = U ] (A.5)
So the government will choose to establish capital controls whenever ψ2(K1, x) >
0, and will choose free capital mobility whenever ψ2(K1, x) ≤ 0. Now, as in
Drazen (1997), assume that the capital controls restriction doesn’t bind in the high
productivity state, so K2(A) > K1, and let the government’s payoff function be
W (·) = ln(·). Then (A.5) can be written as:
ψ2(K1, x) = piln(τK2(A)+x)+(1−pi)ln(τK1+x)−ξ−piln(τK2(A)+x)−(1−pi)ln(x)
(A.6)
Which reduces to:
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ψ2(K1, x) = (1− pi)[ln(τK1 + x)− ln(x)]− ξ (A.7)
Notice that (A.7) is decreasing in x. That means that there is a unique value
of x such that given K1, ψ2(K1, x) = 0. So for a given value of K1, the government
chooses capital controls if x < x , and chooses free capital mobility if x ≥ x.
In period 1, investors choose K1. As in the second period, investors compare
the expected return from investing onshore with the expected return from investing
offshore. When making their decision, investors do not know the government’s
capital mobility policy in the second period, but observe the capital mobility policy
set in the first period, and form a belief about the probability γc11 of observing capital
controls in t=2, given c1.
The marginal expected domestic return for an investor in t = 1 when A1 = A
is:
V1(K1; γ
c1
1 , A1 = A) ≡ AαKα−11 +(1−γc11 +γc11 pi)ρ(1+r)+(1−pi)γc11 ρ(1−τ) (A.8)
Risk neutral investors equalize the expected domestic return with the interna-
tional return, so
V1(K1; γ
c1
1 , A1 = A) = r + ρ(1 + r) (A.9)
Solving (A.9) for K1, it is possible to show that:
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K1 =
(
αA1
r + ρ(1− pi)γc11 (r + τ)
) 1
1−α
(A.10)
Equation (A.10) shows that the more likely investors believe that there will
be capital controls (the higher γc11 ), the lower K1.
Finally, the government will choose in t=1 the capital mobility policy that
yields the highest expected payoff. Letting ψ1(K0, x) be the difference between the
expected payoff from setting capital controls (c1 = R) and the expected payoff from
setting free capital mobility (c1 = U), then:
ψ1(K0, x) = ρE1[ln(τK2 + x|c1 = R)− ln(τK2 + x|c1 = U)]− ξ − ρξI (A.11)
Where I ≡ I(c2 = R) is an indicator function that is equal to one when capital
controls are imposed in period two. Equation (A.11) is decreasing in x17, so there
exists a value x such that ψ1(K0, x) = 0. This result suggests that in equilibrium,
governments with x < x choose capital controls and governments with x ≥ x choose
free capital mobility in period one.
The intuition behind this result is that when exogenous fiscal revenue is scarce
(low x ), the government will impose capital controls in both periods to trap foreign
capital and use it as a source of revenue to finance its expenditures. Nevertheless,
17Bartolini and Drazen (1997) provide a general result for any concave payoff function. Drazen
(1997) presents a numerical example for equation (A.11) where he shows that for low values of
x, the government chooses to impose restrictions on capital mobility in both periods, whereas for
high values of x, the government follows a free capital mobility policy in both periods. He also
shows that for some values of x, the government chooses free capital mobility in t=1, and chooses
capital controls in t=2.
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imposing capital controls in period one increases the likelihood of observing capi-
tal controls in period two, and investors will allocate less capital in the domestic
economy, decreasing revenue that could be raised from capital taxation. But the
government will accept this consequence and choose capital controls when revenue
from other sources is negligible or not available. On the other hand, when exogenous
fiscal revenue is abundant (high x ), the government will choose free capital mobility
in both periods.
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Appendix II: Crisis Definitions
Default Standard & Poor’s
Sample: Argentina 1982, Argentina 1989, Bolivia 1980, Bolivia 1986, Brazil 1983,
Brazil 1986, Brazil 1989, Chile 1983, Costa Rica 1981, Costa Rica 1983, Domini-
can Republic 1982, Ecuador 1982, Ecuador 1999, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1984, El Sal-
vador 1981, Gambia, The 1986, Ghana 1987, Guatemala 1986, Guatemala 1989,
Guinea 1986, Guyana 1979, Guyana 1982, Haiti 1982, Honduras 1981, Indonesia
1998, Jamaica 1978, Jordan 1989, Mexico 1982, Morocco 1983, Nicaragua 1979,
Nigeria 1982, Nigeria 1986, Nigeria 1992, Pakistan 1998, Panama 1983, Panama
1987, Paraguay 1985, Peru 1978, Peru 1980, Peru 1984, Philippines 1983, Roma-
nia 1981, Russian Federation 1998, Senegal 1981, Senegal 1990, South Africa 1985,
South Africa 1989, South Africa 1993, Tanzania 1984, Turkey 1978, Turkey 1982,
Uruguay 1983, Uruguay 1990, Venezuela, RB 1983, Venezuela, RB 1990, Venezuela,
RB 1995, Zambia 1983.
Debt Crisis (Detriagache and Spilimbergo)
Sample: Argentina 1983, Brazil 1983, Burundi 1986, Chile 1983, Colombia 1985,
Costa Rica 1981, Dominican Republic 1976, Dominican Republic 1982, Ecuador
1983, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1986, El Salvador 1984, El Salvador 1995, Guatemala 1985,
Haiti 1983, Honduras 1976, Honduras 1982, Indonesia 1998, Jordan 1989, Korea,
Rep. 1998, Lesotho 1990, Mexico 1982, Morocco 1985, Nicaragua 1978, Nigeria
1986, Panama 1987, Paraguay 1984, Peru 1983, Philippines 1984, Senegal 1984,
Senegal 1989, Sri Lanka 1992, Thailand 1998, Turkey 1979, Venezuela, RB 1984.
Currency Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart)
Sample: Argentina 1981, Argentina 1986, Argentina 1989, Argentina 1990, Bolivia
1982, Bolivia 1983, Bolivia 1985, Brazil 1983, Brazil 1986, Brazil 1989, Brazil 1990,
Brazil 1991, Chile 1976, Chile 1982, Chile 1984, Colombia 1983, Colombia 1985,
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1979, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1989, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1990, Indonesia
1983, Indonesia 1986, Indonesia 1997, Israel 1974, Israel 1977, Israel 1983, Israel
1984, Korea, Rep. 1980, Korea, Rep. 1997, Malaysia 1975, Malaysia 1997, Mex-
ico 1982, Mexico 1994, Peru 1987, Philippines 1983, Philippines 1984, Philippines
1997, South Africa 1975, South Africa 1981, South Africa 1984, South Africa 1996,
Thailand 1978, Thailand 1981, Thailand 1997, Turkey 1980, Turkey 1994, Uruguay
1982, Venezuela, RB 1984, Venezuela, RB 1986, Venezuela, RB 1989, Venezuela,
RB 1994, Venezuela, RB 1995.
Banking Crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart)
Sample: Argentina 1980, Argentina 1985, Argentina 1994, Bolivia 1987, Brazil 1985,
Brazil 1994, Chile 1981, Colombia 1982, Colombia 1998, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980,
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1990, Indonesia 1992, Israel 1983, Korea, Rep. 1986, Korea, Rep.
1997, Malaysia 1985, Malaysia 1997, Mexico 1982, Mexico 1992, Peru 1983, Philip-
pines 1981, Philippines 1997, South Africa 1977, Thailand 1979, Thailand 1996,
Turkey 1991, Uruguay 1981, Venezuela, RB 1993.
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Banking Crisis (Caprio and Klingbiel)
Sample: Argentina 1980, Argentina 1985, Argentina 1995, Bolivia 1986, Brazil 1994,
Colombia 1982, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1980, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1990, Indonesia 1994, Is-
rael 1977, Malaysia 1985, Mexico 1981, Mexico 1995, Philippines 1981, South Africa
1977, Thailand 1983, Turkey 1992 , Turkey 1994, Uruguay 1981, Venezuela, RB
1980, Venezuela, RB 1994.
Banking Crisis (IMF)
Sample: Argentina 1980, Argentina 1985, Argentina 1989, Argentina 1995, Brazil
1990, Brazil 1994, Chile 1976, Chile 1981, Colombia 1982, Egypt, Arab Rep. 1981,
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1990, Indonesia 1992, Indonesia 1997, Israel 1983, Korea, Rep.
1983, Korea, Rep. 1997 , Malaysia 1985, Mexico 1982, Mexico 1984, Peru 1983,
Philippines 1981, South Africa 1980, Thailand 1983, Thailand 1997, Turkey 1982,
Turkey 1991, Turkey 1994, Uruguay 1981, Venezuela, RB 1980, Venezuela, RB 1993.
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Appendix III: Sources and Definitions of Variables
cf: Private net capital flows as a fraction GDP. Capital flows is equal to the sum of
Private Net Equity Securities, Private Net Debt Securities, Private Net Loans,
Private Net Currency and Deposits, Private Net Other Investments and Net
Errors and Omissions. Source: Professor Carmen Reinhart.
usindprod: US industrial production index. Source IFS.
ustrate: US annual Treasury Bill rate. Source IFS.
ukindprod: UK industrial production index. Source IFS.
ukgovyield: UK annual government’s bond yield. Source IFS.
tot: Net barter terms of trade. Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
multipleXR: is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if for a given year a
country has had multipe/dual exchange rates for at least 6 months, and zero
otherwise. To build this variable I look at appendixes 1 and 2 in Reinhart and
Rogoff (2002) Modern History of Exchange Rates.
gap: is the the fraction of output that is above (below) its long run level, due to
cyclical fluctuations. The cyclical component is obtained through applying the
Hodrick- Prescott filter to the the annual series of real GDP from the World
Development Indicators 2003.
domestic return: is the return obtained within the country, taking into account the
devaluation rate. To measure the return in domestic currency I use the IFS
deposits rate. The devaluation rate is taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
inflation: CPI inflation rate. Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
budbal: Primary surplus as a fraction of GDP. Source: World Development Indica-
tors 2003.
openness: is trade openness, where the latter is defined as export plus imports
divided by GDP. Source: World Development Indicators 2003.
civil: civil liberties index, ranges from 1 to 7, where 1 is the best score and 7 is the
worst. Source: Annual Freedom in the World Country Scores.
netres gdp: Foreign net reserves as a fraction of GDP. World Development Indica-
tors 2003.
crisisperyear: The crisis per year regressor adds how many times within a year the
local currency either experiences a monthly depreciation rate greater than or
equal to 12.5% or when the difference from previous month’s depreciation rate
is greater than or equal to 10%. Source: Prof. Carmen Reinhart.
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currcomplt: The percentage of external long-term debt contracted in U.S. dollars for
the low- and middle-income countries. Long-term external debt is defined as
debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year and that
is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services.
Source: Global Development Finance 2001.
manufimports: Is the share of manufactures imports in total imports. Manufactures
comprise the commodities in SITC sections 5 (chemicals), 6 (basic manufac-
tures), 7 (machinery and transport equipment), and 8 (miscellaneous man-
ufactured goods), excluding division 68 (nonferrous metals). Source: World
Development Indicators 2003.
fuelimports: Is the share of fuel imports in total imports. Source: World Develop-
ment Indicators 2003.
stdebt xdebt: Short-term debt to total external debt. Source: Global Development
Finance 2001.
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Appendix IV: Tables
Table 2.1: Net Capital Flows/GDP statistics with and without multiple exchange
rate systems
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
With multiple rates 525 -0.005 4.338 -23.804 24.913
Without multiple rates 591 1.490 5.744 -22.045 56.976
Sample of 46 countries, 1,116 observations, 1974-2001
Table 2.2: Two Sample t-test of Equality of Means
Ho: means are equal
Ha: mean with unitary exchange rates>mean with parallel rates
Variable: capital flows/GDP
t1,086 4.9373
P-value 0.000
Sample of 46 countries, 1,116 observations, 1974-2001
Unequal variances allowed.
Table 2.3: Variance Ratio Test
Ho: Std. Dev. are equal
Ha: Std. Dev. with unitary exchange rates>Std. Dev. with parallel rates
Variable: capital flows/GDP
F 590524 1.753
P-value 0.000
Sample of 46 countries, 1,116 observations, 1974-2001
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Table 2.4: Effective Sample Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
multipleXR 518 0.388 0.488 0.000 1.000
usindprod 518 89.942 15.504 68.250 123.330
ustrate 518 6.526 2.554 3.020 14.080
ukindprod 518 91.426 9.234 74.270 104.200
ukgovyield 518 9.404 2.421 5.380 14.650
tot 518 106.284 24.706 67.790 262.371
gap 517 -0.506 4.306 -17.920 12.398
domesticreturn 518 22.685 100.809 -19.334 1730.762
inflation 518 70.865 544.788 -0.845 7485.495
budbal 518 -2.774 5.142 -35.561 20.626
openness 518 69.138 34.524 6.320 192.114
civil 518 3.884 1.455 1.000 7.000
nres gdp 518 11.761 14.815 0.323 104.639
crisisperyear 518 0.197 0.520 0.000 4.000
currcomplt 503 45.641 20.154 0.400 92.700
stdebt xdebt 503 14.588 9.821 0.564 57.496
fuelimports 442 12.139 9.235 0.319 58.614
manufimports 442 68.650 11.403 37.065 90.592
Sample of 46 developing countries, 1980-2001
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Table 2.6: First Stage Regression of Instruments for Parallel Rates
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.)
usindprod -0.009 (1.52)
ustrate 0.018 (0.69)
ukindprod -0.009 (1.02)
ukgovyield -0.016 (0.45)
tot 0.000 (0.52)
gap(-1) 0.002 (0.32)
domesticreturn(-1) 0.000 (1.37)
inflation(-1) 0.000 (1.39)
budbal(-1) -0.003 (0.44)
openness(-1) -0.006*** (6.85)
civil -0.007 (0.45)
nres gdp(-1) 0.016*** (3.84)
crisisperyear(-1) 0.054 (1.11)
currcomplt(-1) 0.002* (1.90)
manufimports(-1) 0.003 (0.86)
fuelimports(-1) -0.007* (1.68)
stdebt xdebt(-1) -0.005** (2.21)
intercept 2.196*** (2.94)
F-test for joint significance of instruments
(P-value) 0.002
Observations 429
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors have been computed.
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Table 2.7: 2SLS Regression with Leads and Lags of Multiple Exchange Rates
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.)
multipleXR -50.800 (0.78)
multipleXR(+2) -1.132 (0.43)
multipleXR(+1) 27.728 (0.77)
multipleXR(-1) 20.245 (0.66)
multipleXR(-2) 1.947 (0.86)
usindprod -0.010 (0.07)
ustrate -0.772 (1.26)
ukindprod 0.045 (0.26)
ukgovyield 1.356 (1.22)
tot -0.021 (0.92)
gap(-1) -0.057 (0.35)
domesticreturn(-1) 0.017 (0.72)
inflation(-1) -0.003 (0.73)
budbal(-1) 0.124 (0.92)
openness(-1) 0.026 (0.88)
civil(-1) 0.259 (0.58)
nres gdp(-1) 0.103 (0.59)
crisisperyear -1.655 (1.19)
intercept -9.927 (0.66)
F-test (P-value) 0.001
Observations 423
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Robust standard errors have been computed.
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Table 2.8: Estimation Results: DPD Approach
Difference GMM System GMM
Variable Coefficient (t-stat.) Coefficient (t-stat.)
cf(-1) 0.262*** (3.50) 0.409*** (7.36)
usindprod -0.190 (0.99) -0.148 (0.78)
usindprod(-1) 0.105 (0.60) 0.089 (0.52)
ustrate -0.219 (1.18) -0.103 (0.52)
ustrate(-1) -0.311 (0.64) -0.163 (0.35)
ukindprod -0.276 (1.01) -0.346 (1.24)
ukindprod(-1) 0.242 (0.90) 0.337 (1.24)
ukgovyield 0.456 (1.22) 0.214 (0.61)
ukgovyield(-1) -0.148 (0.16) -0.244 (0.26)
tot -0.020 (1.30) -0.004 (0.20)
tot(-1) 0.005 (0.32) -0.002 (0.17)
multipleXR -2.271** (2.37) -1.857** (2.58)
multipleXR(-1) -0.421 (0.54) 0.444 (0.67)
gap 0.019 (0.11) 0.042 (0.25)
gap(-1) -0.096 (1.05) -0.136 (1.48)
domesticreturn 0.004** (2.38) 0.003 (1.33)
domesticreturn(-1) 0.007** (2.19) 0.003 (0.86)
inflation -0.001 (1.47) 0.000 (0.53)
inflation(-1) -0.001 (1.65) 0.000 (0.43)
budbal 0.065 (0.50) 0.095 (0.65)
budbal(-1) -0.113 (0.86) -0.029 (0.23)
openness -0.006 (0.11) -0.056 (0.76)
openness(-1) 0.107 (1.17) 0.069 (0.91)
civil -0.167 (0.25) -0.062 (0.10)
civil(-1) -0.232 (0.32) 0.035 (0.05)
nres gdp 0.030 (0.24) 0.049 (0.42)
nres gdp(-1) -0.096 (0.88) -0.082 (0.71)
crisisperyear -1.376*** (2.80) -1.253** (2.48)
crisisperyear(-1) -1.650* (1.99) -0.814 (1.30)
intercept 10.842 (0.58)
F-test (P-value) 0.000 0.000
m1 0.017 0.008
m2 0.545 0.645
Hansen OIR test (P-value) 1.000 1.000
Observations 398 448
Countries 42 45
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%
m1 and m2 are the P-values for the tests of no first and no second order serial correlation, respectively.
Absolute value of t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Robust standard errors have been computed
The instruments for each equation are:
Diff. GMM: pushiT , push
i
T−1, . . . , push
i
1; tot
i
T , tot
i
T−1, . . . , tot
i
1; cf
i
t−2, cf
i
t−3, . . . , cf
i
1;
pullit−2, pull
i
t−3, . . . , pull
i
1
Syst. GMM: Diff. GMM instruments, ∆pushit−1,∆tot
i
t−1,∆cf
i
t−1,∆pull
i
t−1
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